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INTRODUCTION

In 1999, the United States Supreme Court decided Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc.1 andMurphy v. UnitedParcelService,Inc.,2 in which the Court held
that for purposes of determining whether an individual suffers from a disability
under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("the Act" or "ADA"),3 the
individual must be evaluated in his mitigated or corrected state.4 Additionally,
on the same day as it handed down the Sutton and Murphy opinions, the Court
decided inAlbertson 's,Inc. v. Kirkingburgf that the mitigating measures which
must be evaluated in this disability determination include both "artificial"
mitigating measures such as prosthetic devices and medication, as well as those
measures that the individual's body has developed in order to adequately
compensate for the at-issue physical or mental impairment.6

1. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
2. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
3. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
4. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521. The scope of this Article only covers
the Americans with Disabilities Act. Interestingly, under some state law equivalents of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, state courts have taken the opposite approach and have
concluded that mitigating measures should not be evaluated when determining whether an
individual suffers from a disability under the ADA. See, e.g., Dahill v. Police Dep't of Boston,
748 N.E.2d 956,963 (Mass. 2001) (concluding that mitigating measures should not be taken into
consideration when determining whether an individual suffers from a disability under the
Massachusetts equivalent of the Americans with Disabilities Act).
5. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
6. Id. at 565-66. In Albertson 's the plaintiff's brain developed a mechanism to compensate
for the visual impairment from which the plaintiff suffered. Id. at 565.
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Despite the shared opinion of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission7 (EEOC) and the Department of Justice' that mitigating measures
should not be considered when determining disability status,9 the Court agreed
with the minority position expressed by courts such as the Tenth Circuit and
concluded that the Act's definition of disability required an evaluation of the
individual in his corrected or mitigated state.'" In addition to being inconsistent
with the various agency interpretations of the Act, this conclusion is also
inconsistent with various parts of the Act's legislative history."

7. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2000), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
has authority to issue regulations interpreting the employment provisions of Title I of the ADA.
8. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12134 (2000), the Attorney General of the United States has
authority to issue regulations interpreting the public service sections of Title II of the ADA.
Additionally, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12149 (2000), the Secretary of Transportation has
authority to issue regulations to cover the transportation provisions of Titles II and III of the
ADA.
9. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 app. at 521 (1998). Specifically, the Department of Justice indicated
its belief that
[t]he question of whether a person has a disability should be assessed
without regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such as
reasonable modification or auxiliary aids and services. For example, a
person with hearing loss is substantially limited in the major life activity
of hearing, even though the loss may be improved through the use of a
hearing aid. Likewise, persons with impairments, such as epilepsy or
diabetes, that substantially limit a major life activity, are covered under the
first prong of the definition of disability, even if the effects of the
impairment are controlled by medication.
Id.
The EEOC had issued a similar interpretation. Specifically, the EEOC indicated that "[t]he
determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity must be
made on a case by case basis, without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or
assistive or prosthetic devices." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) app. at 348 (1998).
10. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475-77 (1999).
11. There are various pieces of legislative history that indicate that mitigating measures
were not to be considered when evaluating whether an ADA plaintiff suffers from a disability
under the Act. The most clear and persuasive pieces of such history can be found in the House
and Senate reports. Specifically, the House Judiciary Committee Report indicates that, when
determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, "the impairment
should be assessed without considering whether mitigating measures, such as auxiliary aids or
reasonable accommodations, would result in a less-than-substantial limitation." Sutton, 527 U.S.
at 500 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 (1990)). Similarly,
the Report from the House Committee on Education and Labor indicated that "whether a person
has a disability should be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such
as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids." Sutton, 527 U.S. at 500 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990)). The same House Report also
indicated that "persons with impairments, such as epilepsy or diabetes, which substantially limit
a major life activity," are considered to have a disability "even if the effects of the impairment
are controlled by medication." Sutton, 527 U.S. at 501 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis
omitted) (citing H.R. REP. No. 10 1-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990)). The Report also indicated that "a
person who is hard of hearing is substantially limited in the major life activity of hearing, even
though the loss may be corrected through the use of a hearing aid." Sutton, 527 U.S. at 500
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Despite these facts, the purpose of this Article is not to criticize the Court's
conclusion that mitigating measures should be considered when evaluating
whether an individual who uses mitigating measures has a disability under the
Act. However, one question the Court apparently left unanswered in Sutton,
Murphy, and Albertson s12 was how to evaluate individuals who have

mitigating measures available to them, yet decide not to avail themselves of
these measures, either for cost reasons, cosmetic reasons, reasons affecting
autonomy over personal medical choices, fear of potential side effects, or for
any other reasons. " Both before and after the Sutton trilogy was decided, some
courts maintained that these individuals must also be evaluated with regard to
mitigating measures, even if the individuals decide not to take these available
measures.' 4 In fact, just recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland, in which the lower court ruled that mitigating measures
must be considered even when the plaintiff in that case was not using the
mitigating measure available to her. 5 Shortly thereafter, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of New York relied on the Fourth

(Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 52 (1990)).
Similarly, the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee Report indicates that "whether a
person has a disability should be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating
measures, such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids." Sutton, 527 U.S. at 499-500
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing S. REp. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989)).
12. Collectively, these three opinions will be referred to as the "Sutton trilogy."
13. The reason I use the word "apparently" is because after the Sutton trilogy, as this
Article will demonstrate, courts have not yet come to a unanimous decision as to whether
individuals who do not avail themselves of available mitigating measures must be evaluated in
their corrected or uncorrected state. Compare Tangires v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 79 F. Supp. 2d
587, 596 (D. Md. 2000) (holding that plaintiff did not have a disability under the ADA because,
had she used the available medication, her condition would not have substantially limited any
of her major life activities), aff'd, 230 F.3d 1354 (4th Cir. 2000), with Finical v. Collections
Unlimited, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1032,1037-38 (D. Ariz. 1999) (holding that even though plaintiff
refused to employ mitigating measures, she had a disability under the ADA because, in her
unmitigated condition, she was substantially limited in a major life activity).
14. The following cases, all of which will be discussed in greater detail, infra, can each be
read to stand for the proposition that courts must look at available mitigating measures even if
the plaintiff is not using the mitigating measures: Tangires,79 F. Supp. 2d at 596 (holding that
plaintiff was not disabled because, had she used the available medication, her asthma would not
have substantially limited her in any major life activities); Hewitt v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 185
F. Supp. 2d 183, 189 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (following Tangires and concluding that plaintiff who
suffered from post traumatic stress disorder did not have a disability within the meaning of the
Act because with medication, which the plaintiff did not take, he was not substantially limited
in any major life activities); and Bowers v. Multimedia Cablevision, Inc., No. 96-1298-JTM,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19319, at *4 (D. Kan. Nov. 3, 1998) (concluding that a plaintiff who
suffered from depression but who did not take prescribed medication did not have a disability
within the meaning of the Act).
15. Tangires,79 F. Supp. 2d at 596. The Sixth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Hein
v. AllAmerica Plywood Co., 232 F.3d 482, 487-88 (6th Cir. 2000) (concluding that plaintiff did
not qualify as having a disability under the ADA when he failed to take his medication for
hypertension).
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Circuit's conclusion and held that an individual who did not take advantage of
6
an available mitigating measure was not protected under the Act. Therefore,
it appears that the pro-employer momentum that the Sutton trilogy started is
gaining steam and perhaps shutting the ADA doors on plaintiffs who, because
from the
they are not using mitigating measures and, as a result, are suffering
7
Act.'
the
of
protection
the
need
impairments,
effects of their
However, the approach approved by the Fourth and Sixth Circuits and
followed by the Northern District of New York and other courts, which will be
discussed later in this Article, 8 fails to recognize that an individual should not
9
the
be forced to choose between his possible' protection under the Act and
20 The
way in which he chooses to live with his physical or mental impairment.
purpose of this Article is to question the courts that have, both before and after
Sutton, looked at mitigating measures to conclude that an individual is not
disabled under the Act even though the plaintiff was not using those measures
and was suffering from the effects of the impairment. Additionally, this Article
provides an approach to be used in reasonable accommodation cases brought
under the Act, which would balance the employees' and employers' interests
and further advance the goals and purposes of the Act.
This approach, which would be applicable to cases where an employee
2
requests a reasonable accommodation from his employer, ' would require
16. Hewitt, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 189 (following Tangires and concluding that plaintiff who
suffered from post traumatic stress disorder did not have a disability within the meaning of the
Act because with medication, which the plaintiff did not take, he was not substantially limited
in any major life activities).
17. As was mentioned briefly in note 15, supra,after the Sutton trilogy, the Sixth Circuit
also concluded that mitigating measures must be taken into account when making the disability
determination even if the employee was not utilizing the mitigating measure. Specifically, in
Hein, the court affirmed the district court's granting of summary judgment after concluding that
the plaintiff did not have a disability because he was at fault for not using medication to help his
hypertension. Hein, 232 F.3d at 487.
18. See discussion infra Part I.B. 1.
19. The word "possible" is used because even if an ADA plaintiff can establish that he has
a disability under the Act, he must still prove that he is a "[q]ualified individual with a
disability," who could perform the essential functions of his job with or without a reasonable
accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000).
20. As will be discussed, infra,a plaintiff must establish three elements to demonstrate that
he has a disability within the meaning of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000). First, he
must establish that he has a "physical or mental impairment." Id. This first prong is typically the
least difficult prong for the plaintiff to establish. Second, he must identify a "major life
activit[y]" that the impairment affects. Id. Finally, he must demonstrate that the impairment
"substantially limits" the major life activity. Id.
21. Under the ADA, employers are required to provide "reasonable accommodations" for
individuals with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000). Examples of "reasonable
accommodations" include, but are not limited to, restructured work schedules, physical
alterations to the work premises, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and the
acquisition or modification of equipment or devices. § 1211 1(9)(A)-(B). One defense to the
providing of a reasonable accommodation is the "undue hardship" defense. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
If an employer can prove that the requested accommodation would cause undue hardship, it will
successfully defend the claim. Id. The factors to be considered when analyzing whether an
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courts to evaluate an uncorrected or unmitigated plaintiff in his uncorrected or
unmitigated state when determining whether he has a disability. But, when
determining what constitutes a reasonable accommodation or undue hardship
under the Act, courts could then look at the plaintiffs available mitigating
measures along with his reasons for not availing himself of them and analyze
these factors when deciding these issues. Accordingly, the issue of why the
plaintiff is not availing himself of mitigating measures would go to the issue of
what an employer must do to accommodate the employee and not to the issue
of whether the employee has a disability. This approach would provide an
appropriate balance between the employers' and the employees' interests and
would result in the proper outcome in reasonable accommodation cases brought
under the Act. Additionally, employees would not be forced to make important
personal medical decisions based on how such decisions would affect their
employment status.
The specific factors courts should analyze when making this determination
include the mitigating measure's cost, its level of invasiveness, its potential side
effects, its effectiveness, the cosmetic ramifications of the mitigating measure,
and any other factors that went into the employee's decision not to avail
himself of the mitigating measure. The more expensive, invasive, cosmetically
unappealing, and risky the available mitigating measure becomes, the more the
employer must do to accommodate the employee. On the other hand, if the
mitigating measure is inexpensive, effective, non-invasive, and relatively riskfree, the employer would not be required to do as much for the employee
seeking the accommodation. Therefore, this "sliding scale" approach would
require courts to look at the reasons behind the employee's decision not to use
the available measure and then determine what accommodation is reasonable
or would pose undue hardship on the employer under the Act.2 2 This approach
would certainly require a case-by-case analysis, but such analysis is consistent
with ADA case law.23

accommodation would impose an undue hardship include the cost of the accommodation, the
financial resources of the employer, the number of employees, and the impact of the
accommodation on the operation of the employer. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p) (2002).
22. For a similar approach, see Debra Burke & Malcolm Abel, Ameliorating Medication
andADA Protection: Use it andLose it or Refuse it and Lose it?, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 785 (2001).
23. In Sutton the Supreme Court, relying on its previous opinion in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524
U.S. 624, 641-42 (1998) (holding that plaintiffs asymptomatic HIV-positive status was a
disability under the Act), indicated that these disability determinations must be made on a caseby-case basis. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483. Specifically, the Sutton Court stated that "whether a
person has a disability under the ADA is an individualized inquiry." Id. Cases from most United
States courts of appeals have echoed this proclamation about the need for cases to be analyzed
on a case-by-case basis. See Cotter v. Ajilon Servs., Inc., 287 F.3d 593, 598 (6th Cir. 2002);
Bristol v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 281 F.3d 1148, 1156-57 (10th Cir. 2002); Pollard v. High's
of Baltimore, Inc., 281 F.3d 462, 468 (4th Cir. 2002); Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs.,
Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1280 (11 th Cir. 2001); Mason v. United Air Lines, Inc., 274 F.3d 314, 317
(5th Cir. 2001); Mathieu v. Gopher News Co., 273 F.3d 769, 775 (8th Cir. 2001); Thornton v.
McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 261 F.3d 789, 794 (9th Cir. 2001); Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261
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Although this approach is certainly more pro-employee than the Court's
opinions in Sutton, Murphy, andAlbertson 's, it is an allowable and appropriate
interpretation of the Sutton trilogy, as it will neither give unreasonable
employees the benefits
of the Act, nor encourage individuals to become
"voluntarily disabled."24 Instead, this approach creates a reasonable, balanced
analysis that takes both the employers' and employees' needs into
consideration when determining whether an employee is entitled to protection
under the Act. Such a result is beneficial to all those protected by the Act and
will not unduly benefit employees or unduly burden employers.
However, before addressing this approach, Part II of this Article will first
briefly discuss the Act's definition of disability and the relevant definitions in
the Code of Federal Regulations. Part III will discuss the split that emerged in
the circuits over the issue of whether individuals who are using mitigating
measures should be evaluated in their mitigated or unmitigated state. Part IV
will discuss the Sutton trilogy, placing an emphasis on why the Sutton trilogy
allows for the approach suggested in this Article. Part V will discuss several
cases (both before and after the Sutton trilogy) that have addressed the precise
issue involved in this article: whether individuals who do not avail themselves
of available mitigating measures must be treated as though they do use such
measures. Finally, Part VI will provide examples of why the Sutton trilogy
should not apply to individuals who are not using mitigating measures, and
why the courts should adopt a more pro-plaintiff approach to the issue, an
approach that will further the goals of the Act and will not handcuff employers
in the process.
II. THE ACT'S DEFINITION OF DISABILITY 25
Under the Act, a plaintiff can establish he has a disability in one of three
ways.26 Specifically, the individual could prove he suffers from "a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of [that individual's]
major life activities"; 27 the individual could prove he has "a record of such an

F.3d 90, 104 (1st Cir. 2001); Tice v. Centre Area Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d 506, 515 (3d Cir.
2001); Lawson v. CSX Transp. Inc., 245 F.3d 916, 928 (7th Cir. 2001); Schaefer v. State Ins.
Fund, 207 F.3d 139, 143 (2d Cir. 2000).
24. For a discussion of the term "voluntary disability," see Lisa E. Key, Voluntary

Disabilitiesand the ADA: A Reasonable Interpretationof 'ReasonableAccommodations,' 48
HASTINGs L.J. 75 (1996).

25. This definition was modeled after the applicable definition in the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 705(9) (2000). The definition provided in the ADA states, with respect to

an individual, that the term "disability" means: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of
such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)
(2000). However, for purposes of this Article, I will only be focusing on the first prong of the

"disability" definition.
26. § 12102(2).
27. § 12102(2)(A).
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impairment";" or the individual could prove he is "regarded as having such an
impairment."29 Although the United States Code defines "disability," it is the
Code of Federal Regulations that further elaborates on the essential terms of
this definition. a Specifically, one must look to the Code of Federal Regulations
for the definitions of the terms "impairment, 31 "substantially limits," 2 and
"major life activity.""
Although most plaintiffs are able to satisfy the definition of physical or
mental impairment and are typically able to identify a major life activity that
is limited by such an impairment, it is the substantially limits definition that
causes plaintiffs so much trouble when attempting to prevail on a claim brought
under the Act. With respect to the issue raised in this Article, it is the definition
of substantially limits that is most critical. As more and more ADA cases were
brought by plaintiffs who believed they were covered by the Act, this definition
led various district courts and courts of appeals to come to different conclusions
about the meaning of that term, especially how that term applies when the issue
of mitigating measures arises.

28. § 12102(2)(B).
29. § 12102(2)(C).
30. The regulations that apply to the employment-related aspects of the Act, which were
promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, can be found at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630 (2002).
31. Section 1630.2(h) defines a physical or mental impairment as:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory
(including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive,
genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation,
organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific
learning disabilities.
32. Section 1630.2()(1) defines "substantially limits" as:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the
general population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under
which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as
compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the
average person in the general population can perform that same major
life activity.
The EEOC also listed factors that must be considered when determining whether an
individual is substantially limited in a major life activity. These factors include "(i) [t]he nature
and severity of the impairment; (ii) [t]he duration or expected duration of the impairment; and
(iii) [t]he permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or
resulting from the impairment." § 1630.20)(2).
33. Section 1630.2(i) defines "major life activity" as "functions such as caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."
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III. OPINIONS LEADING UP TO THE SUTTON TRILOGY

Prior to the Supreme Court's opinions in Sutton, Murphy, andAlbertson's,
various circuits in the United States courts of appeals had reached inconsistent
answers to the question of whether, when determining if an individual suffers
from a disability within the meaning of the Act, the individual should be
evaluated in his mitigated or unmitigated condition. Some circuits had ruled
that plaintiffs must be evaluated with their corrective measures taken into
account,34 while other circuits believed that plaintiffs should be evaluated
without respect to mitigating measures.3 5 Finally, one circuit took the middle
ground between the two positions and concluded that only in certain, limited
circumstances should plaintiffs be evaluated without regard to mitigating
measures.36 This conflict led the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in the Sutton
37
case.

A.

Opinions in Which Courts Refused to Look at MitigatingMeasures

One circuit that had determined mitigating measures should not be taken
into account when determining whether an individual had a disability and thus
was covered by the Act was the First Circuit.31 In Arnold v. United Parcel
Service, Inc.39 the plaintiff sued after the defendant decided that it would not

hire the insulin-dependent plaintiff as a mechanic.4" The plaintiffwas originally

informed that he would be hired as a mechanic, but after learning about the
plaintiff s diabetes, the employer told the plaintiff that he could not be hired as
a mechanic and instead offered the plaintiff a substantially lower-paying job.4 1
This decision was based on the fact that the Department of Transportation
(DOT) did not allow insulin-dependent diabetics to obtain the DOT
certification required to operate commercial motor vehicles.42

34. See, e.g, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding
that the determination of whether an individual's impairment substantially limits a major life
activity should take into consideration the mitigating or corrective measure utilized by the
individual).
35. For example, the following cases, in addition to others that will be referenced later in
this Article, held that mitigating measures should not be taken into account when making the
disability determination under the Act: Bartlett v. New York State Board ofLaw Examiners, 156
F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998); Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir. 1998);
Arnold v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 863 (1st Cir. 1998); Matczak v. Frankford
Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937 (3d Cir. 1997); Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d
624, 627 (8th Cir. 1997); and Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362 (9th Cir. 1996).
36. Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Tex., Inc., 152 F.3d 464,471 (5th Cir. 1998).
37. 527 U.S. at 477.
38. See Arnold, 136 F.3d at 863.
39. Id. at 854.
40. Id. at 856-57.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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The plaintiff sued United Parcel Service, alleging violations of the ADA
and the equivalent Maine Human Rights Act. 43 The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of United Parcel Service, concluding that the
plaintiff's diabetes needed to be evaluated in its mitigated state. 44 The court
decided that because the plaintiff had been able to control his diabetes for
twenty-three years, he did not have a disability under the ADA because his
condition, with medication, did not substantially limit one or more of his major
life activities.4"
The First Circuit reversed and instead held that the ADA plaintiff must be
evaluated in his unmitigated or uncorrected state." The court reached this
conclusion after reciting and relying on various canons of statutory
construction. 47 First, the First Circuit concluded that the plain language of the

43. Id. The Maine Human Rights Act can be found at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 455155 (West 2002).
44. Arnold, 136 F.3d at 857. The district court's opinion can be found at Arnold v. United
Parcel Service, Inc., No. 96-294-P-H, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22026, at *13 (D. Me. May 5,
1997).
45. Arnold, 136 F.3d at 857. As was indicated earlier, the three elements the plaintiff in an
ADA case must establish to prove he suffers from a disability are (1) a physical or mental
impairment; (2) that substantially limits; (3) a major life activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)
(2000).
46. Arnold, 136 F.3d at 863. Interestingly, the First Circuit limited its opinion to a certain
extent. Specifically, in footnote 10 of the opinion, the First Circuit noted that it might have come
to a different conclusion under a different set of facts. Id. at 866 n.10. Specifically, the court
observed the following:
For example, we might reach a different result in the case of a myopic
individual whose vision is correctable with eyeglasses. The availability of
such a simple, inexpensive remedy, that can provide assured, total and
relatively permanent control of all symptoms, would seem to make
correctable myopia the kind of "minor, trivial impairment[]," that would
not be considered a disability under the ADA.
Id. at 866 n. 10 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Interestingly, the factors the First Circuit
took into account in this footnote, the cost of the corrective measure, the effectiveness of the
corrective measure, and the simplicity of the corrective measure, are factors this Article suggests
that courts analyze in making the determination of whether a requested accommodation is
reasonable under the Act.
47. Specifically, the court utilized the following canons of statutory construction: "The
'starting point for interpretation of a statute "is the language of the statute itself ..... Arnold, 136
F.3d at 857 (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990));
"If the language of a statute 'is plain and admits of no more than one meaning' and 'if the law
is within the constitutional authority of the law-making body which passed it,' then 'the duty of
interpretation does not arise' and 'the sole function of the courts is to enforce the statute
according to its terms."' Id. at 857-58 (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485
(1917)); "The plain meaning of a statute's text must be given effect'unless it would produce an
absurd result or one manifestly at odds with the statute's intended effect."' Id. at 858 (quoting
Parisi by Cooney v. Chater, 69 F.3d 614,617 (1st Cir. 1995)); "[W]e focus on 'the plain meaning
of the whole statute, not of isolated sentences."' Id. (quoting Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S.
368, 372 (1994)); and "[W]e interpret the statute's words 'in light of the purposes Congress
sought to serve."' Id. (quoting Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 118 (1983)
(citation omitted)).
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ADA was not clear on the issue of whether mitigating measures should be
evaluated when determining whether an individual suffers from a disability
under the Act, and that because of this ambiguity, other methods of statutory
interpretation were necessary.48 After reaching this conclusion about the
unclear language of the ADA, the First Circuit moved to the legislative history
behind the ADA.49
Relying on the legislative history, the First Circuit concluded that
mitigating measures should not be taken into consideration when evaluating
whether a plaintiff satisfies the Act's definition of disability. 0 Specifically, the
court noted the following:
Both the explicit language and the illustrative examples
included in the ADA's legislative history make it abundantly
clear that Congress intended the analysis of an "impairment"
and of the question whether it "substantially limits a major
life activity" to be made on the basis of the underlying
(physical or mental) condition, without considering the
ameliorative effects of medication, prostheses, or other
mitigating measures."
The First Circuit looked specifically at the House and Senate committee
reports, which unequivocally indicated that when making the determination of
whether an individual has a disability under the Act, the "impairment 'should
be assessed without considering whether mitigating measures, such as auxiliary
aids or reasonable accommodations, would result in a less-than-substantial
limitation.', 5 2 The First Circuit also observed that Congress "spoke directly"
to the issue of diabetes when, in the House Labor Report, it indicated that
",persons with impairments, such as epilepsy or diabetes, which substantially
limit a major life activity,' are considered to have a disability, 'even if the
effects of the impairment are controlled by medication."' 53
The First Circuit then looked at other, potentially conflicting parts of the
Act's legislative history and concluded that despite this potential conflict,
mitigating measures should not be taken into account when making the
disability determination.54 Therefore, the court reversed the district court's

48. Id. at 858-59.
49. Arnold, 136 F.3d at 859.
50. Id. at 863.

51. Id. at 859.
52. Id. at 859-60 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 (1990), reprintedin 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,451).

53. Id. at 860 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51-52 (1990), reprintedin 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1989)).
54. Id. at 860.
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granting of summary judgment in favor of the employer. 5 The court also noted
that because the Act was a remedial statute and that these remedial statutes
must be interpreted in a way to effectuate the congressional purpose behind the
legislation,56 requiring an evaluation with mitigating measures taken into
consideration would have helped employers at the expense of employees and,
thus, gone against this general principle.57
After addressing the Act's legislative history, the First Circuit then
addressed the EEOC's interpretation of the Act, which had indicated that
mitigating measures should not be used in determining whether an individual
suffers from a disability.58 The court recognized that the EEOC Interpretive
Guidelines, although not controlling like the regulations promulgated by
executive agencies, "do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment
to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance." 9 Because the
EEOC's position was therefore entitled to some deference, and because it was
consistent with the legislative history and broad remedial purpose behind the
Act, the First Circuit concluded that it reached the correct result in this case. 60
The First Circuit also noted that the majority of United States courts of
appeals addressing this issue had ruled in favor of not looking at plaintiffs in

55. Arnold, 136 F.3d at 860-61. The specific part of the Act's legislative history that the
First Circuit thought to be in conflict with the plaintiff's position came from the Senate Report,
which indicated:
Another important goal of the third prong of the definition is to ensure that
persons with medical conditions that are under control, and that therefore
do not currently limit major life activities, are not discriminated against on
the basis of their medical conditions. For example, individuals with
controlled diabetes or epilepsy are often denied jobs for which they are
qualified. Such denials are the results of negative attitudes and
misinformation.
Id. at 860 (citing S. REP. No. 101-116, at 24 (1989)).
The district court found that this language was clear evidence that people with controlled
impairments did not satisfy the first prong of the disability definition under the Act. Id. at 860.
The First Circuit ultimately dismissed this pro-employer interpretation of the legislative history,
reasoning that the pro-employee language came after the Senate Report, that the broad remedial
purpose of the Act would not be furthered by the pro-employer interpretation of the Act, and that
the two different parts of the legislative history were not necessarily inconsistent with one
another. Id.
56. Id. at 861.
57. Other courts have also concluded that mitigating measures should not be considered
when determining whether an individual has a disability within the meaning of the ADA.
Specifically, the Second Circuit, in Bartlett v. New York State BoardofLaw Examiners, 156 F.3d
321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998), concluded that the plaintiff did have a disability even though she was
able to correct her reading or learning impairment through self-accommodation. This outcome
was also reached by the Eighth Circuit in Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir.
1997), when the court concluded that an individual who learned to adjust for his visual
impairment was still disabled because mitigating measures should not be taken into account
when making the initial determination of disability under the Act.
58. Arnold, 136 F.3d at 863-64.
59. Id. at 864 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B., v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)).
60. Id.
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their corrected states. 6' Thus, the First Circuit, while it did limit its holding to
the facts of the case before it, took a pro-employee stance and concluded that
mitigating measures should not be evaluated when making the disability
determination under the Act.62
B. Opinions in Which Courts Looked at MitigatingMeasures
Unlike the First Circuit, the Tenth Circuit took a pro-employer stance when
confronted with the issue of whether to evaluate ADA plaintiffs in their
corrected or uncorrected state.63 Before the Sutton case went to the Supreme
Court, the Tenth Circuit heard the case and was faced with the issue of whether
mitigating measures must be taken into consideration when determining
whether an individual has a disability within the meaning of the ADA." In
Sutton the plaintiffs were sisters who suffered from vision problems (severe
myopia) and were eventually rejected as candidates for the position of
commercial airline pilot.6" Without the use of corrective measures (eyeglasses
or contact lenses), the plaintiffs' vision was substantially worse than the
employer required.66 However, with the corrective measures, both plaintiffs
enjoyed 20/20 vision.67
The district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding
that because the plaintiffs had 20/20 vision with the assistance of the
eyeglasses, they were not disabled under the Act.6" The plaintiffs appealed, and
the Tenth Circuit considered whether mitigating measures should be taken into
account when determining whether a plaintiff has a disability under the Act.69

61. Id. at 865. Specifically, the court cited the following cases: Matczak v. Frankford
Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937-38 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that the determination
of whether an individual has a disability under the ADA should be made without reference to
mitigating measures); Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627-28 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding
that even when an individual is employing self-accommodations to compensate for his disability,
he is not precluded from gaining possible protection under the ADA); Holihan v. Lucky Stores,
Inc., 87 F.3d 362,366 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that mitigating measures should notbe considered
when assessing whether an individual has a disability under the ADA); Harris v. H & W
Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 521 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that under an ADA claim, an
individual should be assessed in his unmitigated condition); and Roth v. Lutheran General
Hospital,57 F.3d 1446, 1454 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the analysis of whether an individual
has a disability does not include consideration of mitigating measures).
62. Arnold, 136 F.3d at 866.
63. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 895.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 896. The district court's opinion can be found at Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
No. 96-S-121, 1996 WL 588417 (D. Colo. Aug. 28, 1996).
69. Sutton, 130 F.3d at 896-97.
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After indicating that an ADA plaintiff must prove she suffers from an
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity," the Tenth Circuit
concluded that the plaintiffs' vision problems were indeed impairments"' and
that seeing was a major life activity.72 Therefore, the issue on appeal was
whether these vision impairments substantially limited the major life activity
of seeing.73 Although the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the EEOC had
already determined mitigating measures should not be considered in this issue,
the court decided to reject the EEOC's position.74 The Tenth Circuit concluded
that the EEOC's position was in direct conflict with the substantially limits
language of the Act and that the EEOC's proclamations on this issue were also
in conflict with other portions of its own Interpretive Guidelines.75 Specifically,
the Tenth Circuit pointed to the following language from the Interpretive
Guidelines:
Many impairments do not impact an individual's life to the
degree that they constitute disabling impairments. An
impairment rises to the level of disability if the impairment
substantially limits one or more of the individual's major life
activities ....
The ADA and this part, like the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, do not attempt a "laundry list" of impairments that are
"disabilities." The determination of whether an individual has
a disability is not necessarily based on the name or the
diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on the
70. Id. at 898.
71. Id. at 900.
72. Id.

73. Id. at 900-01.
74. Id. at 902. Under the Chevron doctrine, which originated in Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v.
NaturalResourceDefense Council,Inc., 467 U.S. 837,843-44 (1984), unless the plain language
of a statute is clear, courts should defer to an interpretation of the statute by the agency charged

with its enforcement if the agency's interpretation is a "permissible construction" of the statute's
language and legislative history. A "permissible construction" is one that is not "arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Id. Under this doctrine, "[t]he court need not
conclude that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to

uphold the construction, or even the reading the court would have reached if the question
initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding." Id. at n. 11 (citing FEC V. Democratic Senatorial
Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 39 (1981); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443,
450 (1978); Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 75 (1975); Udall v. Tallman,
380 U.S. 1, 16(1965); Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Aragon, 329U.S. 143, 153 (1946); and

McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477,480-481 (1921)). Although the regulations promulgated by
the appropriate agency are entitled to this deference, the Interpretive Guidelines issued by those
agencies are not entitled to such a high degree of deference. Batterson v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416,
424-26 (1977) (noting that regulations issued pursuant to a statutory grant of authority can be

set aside only if they exceed the given authority or are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or not otherwise in accordance with the law," but agency interpretations of those
regulations are not entitled to such a great level of deference).
75. Sutton, 130 F.3d at 902.
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effect of that impairment on the life of the individual. Some
impairments may be disabling for particular individuals but
not for others, depending on the stage of the disease or
disorder, the presence of other impairments that combine to
make the impairment disabling or any number of other
factors.76
The Tenth Circuit concluded that this language, especially the language
focusing on the effect the impairment had on the individual's life, was proof
that the EEOC's position was inconsistent and therefore not worthy of being
followed." The Tenth Circuit also focused on an apparent inconsistency with
other parts of the Interpretive Guidelines, which addressed the difference
between an actual disability (under the first part of the definition of disability)
and the "regarded as" prong of the definition of disability.78 Therefore, the
Tenth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs' mitigating measures must be taken
into consideration when making the initial determination of whether they had
a disability under the Act.79 Because of this, the Tenth Circuit concluded that
the plaintiffs were not disabled; therefore, United was entitled to prevail.80
C. A Court That Took a "Middle Ground" Approach Between the Two
Positions
An example of a pre-Sutton case where the court took a middle ground on
the issue of whether mitigating measures should be evaluated when
determining if an individual suffers from a disability within the meaning of the
Act is Washington v. HCA Health Services of Texas, Inc.81 In Washington the
Fifth Circuit reached a middle ground between the two conflicting positions
articulated by the First and Tenth Circuits. Specifically, although the Fifth
Circuit ruled in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of whether mitigating
measures should be evaluated in the disability determination in this case, the
court specified that it was not adopting a bright-line rule that mitigating
measures should never be taken into consideration when making the disability
determination under the ADA.8

76. Id. at 902 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) app. at 350 (2002)) (alteration in original).
77. Id. at 902.
78. Id.

79. Id. The Tenth Circuit proceeded to address the issue of the plaintiffs' being regarded
as disabled. Id. at 902-05. However, that part of the opinion is not directly relevant to the focus
of this Article. As was indicated previously, this Article focuses only on the first prong of the

definition of disability.
80. Sutton, 130 F.3d at 902-03.

81. 152 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 1998).
82. Id. at 470-71.
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In Washington the plaintiff sued his former employer after he was released
from his position as a senior accountant." The plaintiff suffered from Adult
Stills Disease, a condition that affected his bones,joints, and kidneysY. To treat
himself for this disease, the plaintiff took medication and was, according to the
court, able to lead a "relatively normal life." 85 After originally granting the
employer's motion for summary judgment and then being reversed by the Fifth
Circuit,86 the district court eventually denied the employer's second motion for
summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff s corrective measures should
not be taken into consideration when making the initial disability
determination, and that the plaintiff did indeed suffer from a disability within
the meaning of the ADA. 7 The sole issue before the Fifth Circuit was whether
the court must "assess an individual's condition with or without regard to
mitigating measures, when determining whether that individual is disabled
under the ADA.""8
Similar to the First Circuit, the Fifth Circuit first concluded that the plain
language of the ADA was not unambiguous and therefore required an
examination into other sources to determine how to evaluate an ADA
plaintiff. 9 Not surprisingly, the Fifth Circuit turned to the legislative history
and the EEOC for guidance on this issue. 90 With respect to the legislative
history, the Fifth Circuit cited two provisions that weighed heavily in favor of
ADA plaintiffs. 9 First, the court looked at the House Education and Labor
Committee Report, which noted:
Whether a person has a disability should be assessed
without regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such
as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids. For
example, a person who is hard of hearing is substantially
limited in the major life activity of hearing, even though the
loss may be corrected through the use of a hearing aid.
Likewise, persons with impairments, such as epilepsy or
diabetes, which substantially limit a major life activity, are
covered under the first prong of the definition of disability,

83. Id. at 466.
84. Id.

85. Id.
86. Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Tex., Inc., 906 F. Supp. 386 (S.D. Tex. 1995),

rev 'd 95
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

F.3d 45 (5th Cir. 1996).
Washington, 152 F.3d at 466.
Id. at 467.
Id. at 467.
Id. at 467-70.
Id. at 467-68.
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even if the effects of the impairment are controlled by
medication.92
The court then looked at a provision from the House Judiciary Committee
Report that essentially reached the same conclusion. 93 Specifically, the court
looked at the following language:
The impairment should be assessed without considering
whether mitigating measures, such as auxiliary aids or
reasonable accommodations, would result in a less-thansubstantial limitation. For example, a person with epilepsy, an
impairment which substantially limits a major life activity, is
covered under this test, even if the effects of the impairment
which substantially limits a major life activity, is also
covered, even if the hearing loss [sic] is corrected by the use
of a hearing aid.94
Although the Fifth Circuit then addressed some legislative history that it
found to be inconsistent with this position, 95 it ultimately concluded that the
legislative history behind the ADA led to the conclusion in this case that
mitigating measures should not be taken into consideration when determining96
whether an individual suffers from a disability within the meaning of the Act.
The Fifth Circuit reached this conclusion because the House Report came after
the Senate Report and because the House Report spoke directly to the issue at
hand, while the Senate Report was not directly on point with the issue currently
pending before the court. 97
The Fifth Circuit then evaluated the EEOC's Interpretive Guidelines.98 The
EEOC, as well as the Department of Justice,99 had already established the
position that mitigating measures should not be taken into account when

92. Id. at 467 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), reprintedin 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,334).
93. Washington, 152 F.3d at 468.
94. Id. (quoting H.R. REP.No. 101-485,pt. 3, at28 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
445,451).
95. Id. at 468. Specifically, the court looked at the Senate Labor and Human Resources
Committee Report, which, when describing the third prong of the disability definition, observed
that "[a]nother important goal of the third prong of the definition is to ensure that persons with
medical conditions that are under control, and that therefore do not currently limit major life
activities, are not discriminated against on the basis of their medical conditions." Id. (quoting S.
REP. No. 101 - 116, at 24 (1989)).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Washington, 152 F.3d at 468-70.
99. As was addressed earlier, the Department ofJustice previously addressed this issue and
concluded that mitigating measures should not be taken into account when making a disability
determination under the Act. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 app. at 521 (1998).
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making the initial disability determination in an ADA case.'0 0 Specifically, the
Fifth Circuit noted that in its Interpretive Guidelines, the EEOC indicated "that
under the ADA a plaintiff should be assessed in his unmedicatedcondition in
order to determine whether he is disabled.''. The Fifth Circuit further noted
that the EEOC also indicated that the "existence of an impairment must be
determined without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or
assistive or prosthetic devices."'' 0 2 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit noted that the
EEOC concluded that "the 'determination of whether an individual is
substantially limited in a major life activity' must be made without regard to
mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices."'0 3
Although the Fifth Circuit noted that not all courts had decided to follow the
EEOC's position, it felt somewhat compelled to follow the legislative history
10 4
behind the ADA and the EEOC's interpretation of it.
However, in reaching its conclusion, instead of announcing a blanket rule
that mitigating measures were not to be taken into consideration when making
the disability determination, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that only in some
circumstances (such as in situations where the impairments are serious) were
mitigating measures not to be taken into account, and that this determination
was to be made on a case-by-case basis.0 5 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit noted:
Although we think it is more reasonable to say that
mitigating measures must be taken into account, we recognize
that our position is not so much more reasonable to warrant
overruling the EEOC. Thus, we will follow the EEOC
Guidelines and the legislative history, but we read them
narrowly. There is nothing in the Interpretive Guidelines or
the legislative history that suggests that all impairments must
be considered in their unmitigated states and no mitigating
measures may ever be taken into account.
We hold that only serious impairments and ailments that
are analogous to those mentioned in the EEOC Guidelines
and the legislative history-diabetes, epilepsy, and hearing
impairments-will be considered in their unmitigated state.
The impairments must be serious in common parlance, and
they must require that the individual use mitigating measures
on a frequent basis, that is, he must put on his prosthesis
every morning or take his medication with some continuing
100. Washington, 152 F.3d at 468.
101. Id. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) app. at 347 (1998).
102. Washington, 152 F.3d at 468-69 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) app. at 347).
103. Id. at 469 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) app. at 348).
104. Id. at 469. Interestingly, when referring to the cases which had determined that
mitigating measures should be taken into consideration, the Fifth Circuit indicated that those
opinions offered the most reasonable reading of the Act. Id.
105. Id. at 470-71.
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regularity. In order for us to ignore the mitigating measures,
they must be continuous and recurring; if the mitigating
measures amount to permanent corrections 10or6 ameliorations,
then they may be taken into consideration.
The Fifth Circuit continued to explain the following:
Whether an individual must be evaluated without regard
to mitigating measures depends on both the nature of the
impairment and the mitigating measures employed by the
individual. Thus, these issues must be considered on a case[]by[-]case basis to determine whether the individual disease
and the accompanying mitigation fall within the scope of the
EEOC Guidelines and the legislative history. Some
conditions, such as diabetes, will clearly have to be
considered without regard to mitigating measures; others,
such as hip replacements, will have to be evaluated with
regard to mitigating measures. But most cases will not be as
clear and we leave these for another day. For example, a
correctable vision impairment, may or may not be sufficiently
similar to the ailments enumerated in the EEOC Guidelines
and legislative history, and as such we cannot say whether
mitigating measures such as eyeglasses or laser surgery
should be considered in assessing whether an individual is
disabled. 07
It was clear from the Fifth Circuit's opinion that this determination was to
be made on a case-by-case basis'0" and that the court was not entirely
comfortable with its ultimate decision.
Fortunately for the United States courts of appeals that were struggling
with this issue, the Supreme Court would soon hear the Sutton, Murphy, and
Alberton's cases and give some direction in how to treat mitigating measures
under the ADA. However, for ADA plaintiffs, the Supreme Court's decisions
in Sutton, Murphy, andAlbertson's would greatly limit the scope of the Act that
was once highly praised as a landmark piece of legislation enacted to help

106. Washington, 152 F.3d at 470-71 (footnote omitted).

107. Id. at 471.
108. With the facts presented, the Fifth Circuit concluded that mitigating measures should
not be taken into consideration in Washington and therefore ruled in favor of the plaintiff on this
issue. Id. Because the plaintiff's condition was analogous to the conditions specifically listed in
the legislative history of the ADA and the EEOC Guidelines, and because his condition was
serious enough to require medication on a daily basis, the court concluded that the plaintiffs
condition was serious enough to warrant an examination of his condition without taking into
account corrective measures. Id.
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individuals who needed it most. 0 9 Additionally, instead of clearing up the issue
of whether mitigating measures must be evaluated when plaintiffs are not using
them, the Court's opinions only laid the groundwork for more confusion over
this issue.
IV. THE SUTTON TRILOGY
A.

The Sutton Opinion"..

Finally, after the various circuits in the United States courts of appeals had
reached different conclusions with respect to whether mitigating measures must
be evaluated when determining whether an individual suffers from a disability
under the Act, the Supreme Court decided to resolve this critical issue. 1
As discussed above, two sisters with severe myopia sued United Air Lines
after their applications for employment were rejected because of their inability
to meet United's minimum vision requirements.' 12 After exhausting their
administrative remedies, the sisters sued United in the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado, alleging violations of the ADA. 1 3 The
district court granted United's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, holding that
because the plaintiffs were able to fully correct their visual impairments, they
were not substantially limited in any major life activity and thus not disabled
under the Act.'"4 The district court also determined that the sisters' allegations
were insufficient to satisfy their claim that they were "regarded as" ' 5 having
an impairment which substantially limited a major life activity." 6 Specifically,
the district court found the allegation that they were regarded as being
substantially limited in their ability to perform the requirements of a particular
job was insufficient to establish that they were regarded as being substantially
limited in the major life activity of working.'' 7

109. At the signing of the ADA, President Bush observed the following: "With today's
signing of the landmark Americans for [sic] Disabilities Act, every man, woman, and child with
a disability can now pass through once-closed doors, into a bright new era of equality,
independence and freedom." President George H. Bush, Remarks of President George Bush at

the Signing of the Americans with Disabilities Act
http://www.eeoc.gov/ada/bushspeech.html.
110. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
111.

(July

26,

1990),

Id. at 477.

112. Id. at 475-76.
113. Id. at 476.
114. Id. The district court opinion can be found at Sutton v. UnitedAirLines,Inc., Civ. A.
No. 96-S-121, 1996 WL 588917 (D. Colo.Aug. 28, 1996).

115. In addition to establishing that she has a physical or mental impairment, an individual
may also gain protection under the ADA by establishing (1) that there is a "record of such an
impairment" or (2) that she is "regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(2)(B)-(C) (2000).
116. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 476.
117. Id. at 476-77.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, using
odds with
similar reasoning."s Because the Tenth Circuit's conclusion was at9 Second,1
20
First,"
the
from
Appeals
of
Courts
States
United
opinions from the
22
Third,' 2 ' Fifth, Seventh,

2 3

Eighth, 124 andNinth
2 6

25

Circuits, the Supreme Court

granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.
As expected, the Court first turned to the Act's definition of "disability" in
deciding whether mitigating measures should be taken into consideration when
2 7
Then, after observing that various federal
making this determination.
agencies had the responsibility ofpromulgating regulations for the various titles
of the Act, 21 the Court observed that no agency had the authority to issue
regulations implementing the generally applicable provisions of the Act,
2
including the definition of the term disability. However, the Court noted that
the EEOC and the Attorney General had indeed issued Interpretive Guidelines,
resolving the issue in favor of ignoring mitigating measures when determining
30
whether an individual has a disability.
118. Id. at 477. The Tenth Circuit's opinion can be found at Sutton v. UnitedAir Lines,
Inc., 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997).
119. Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 866 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that
the determination of whether an individual has a disability under the ADA should be made
without consideration of mitigating measures and ameliorative treatments).
120. Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding
that the assessment of whether an individual has a disability under the ADA should be made
without regard to self-accommodating measures).
121. Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937-38 (3d Cir. 1997)
(holding that the determination of whether an individual has a disability under the ADA should
be made without reference to mitigating measures).
122. Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Tex., Inc., 152 F.3d 464, 471 (5th Cir. 1998)
(holding that some, but not all, impairments are to be considered in their unmitigated states).
123. Baert v. Euclid Beverage Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the
court should assess whether an individual has a disability under the ADA without regard to
mitigating measures).
124. Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that even when
an individual is employing self-accommodations to compensate for his disability, he is not
precluded from gaining possible protection under the ADA).
125. Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
mitigating measures should not be considered when assessing whether an individual has a
disability under the ADA).
126. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,477 (1999).
127. Id. at 478.
128. Id. at 478-79. As noted previously, the EEOC and the Attorney General had been
given authority to promulgate regulations that were to apply to the various portions of the Act.
See supra notes 7-8. The EEOC was responsible for promulgating regulations applicable to the
employment-related aspects of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2000), while the Attorney General
was responsible for promulgating regulations applicable to the public services portions of the
Act. See § 12134.
129. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 479.
130. Id. at 480. Specifically, the Court pointed out that according to the EEOC Interpretive
Guidelines applicable to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (1998), "[tlhe determination of whether an
individual is substantially limited in a major life activity must be made on a case by case basis,
without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices."
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The sisters argued that because the Act did not directly address the issue
of whether to consider mitigating measures, reliance on agency interpretation
was appropriate.'' However, United argued that no deference was due to the
agency interpretations because the Act's plain language conflicted with those
interpretations. 3 2 The Court was persuaded that the plain language of the Act
did indeed conflict with the agency interpretation and that mitigating measures
must therefore be taken into consideration when determining whether an
individual suffers from a disability.'33
The Court relied on three separate provisions of the Act to reach this
conclusion. 3 4 First, the Court looked at the phrase "substantially limits" and
concluded that because that phrase was drafted in the present indicative verb
form, it was intended to cover people who are presently, and not potentially or
hypothetically, substantially limited.'35 The Court also evaluated the Act's
language requiring the definition of disability to be evaluated "with respect to
an individual."' 3 6 The Court concluded that by focusing on the individual, and
not merely on a specific diagnosis, the Act required the evaluation of the effect
of mitigating measures on the ADA plaintiff.'37 Finally, the Court looked to the
Congressional finding that "some 43,000,000 Americans" suffer from
disabilities and concluded that if Congress did not intend for mitigating
measures to be taken into account, the number of Americans with disabilities
Congress referenced would have been much higher. 3 Therefore, the Court
concluded that the sisters were not disabled under the Act.' 9
The Court then addressed the "regarded as" prong of the definition of
disability and concluded that the sisters were not regarded as being

Sutton, 527 U.S. at 480 (alteration in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) app. at 348 (1998)).
The Court also observed that the Department of Justice had issued a similar opinion on the issue
of mitigating measures in its Interpretive Guidelines. Id. at 480.
131. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 481.
132. Id. at 481-82.
133. Id. at 482.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 482-83.
136. Id. at 483.
137. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) app. at 348 (1998)).
138. Id. at 484-88 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2000)). The Court could not specify the
source of the figure; however, it did mention a few possibilities. Specifically, the Court noted
that the corresponding finding in the 1988 forerunner to the ADA was drawn from a report by
the National Council on Disability. Id. at 484 (citing RobertL. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with
DisabilitiesAct: Analysis and Implications of a Second Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413, 434 n.117 (1991)). In addition, the Court noted that in 1988, the
Council issued an updated report wherein a similar number of individuals was listed as suffering
from a "functional limitation." Sutton, 527 U.S. at 485 (citing NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY,
ON

THE

THRESHOLD

OF

INDEPENDENCE

17

(1998),

available

at

http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/threshold.html).
139. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488-89.
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substantially limited in the major life activity of working. 4 ' This conclusion
was partly based on the high burden a plaintiff must meet to demonstrate that
major life activity of working.' 41 Justices
she is substantially limited in 4the
2
dissented.1
Stevens and Breyer
B. Five CriticalStatements and Factsfrom the Sutton Opinion
Although many courts have interpreted Sutton as requiring courts to
evaluate uncorrected plaintiffs as though they were indeed employing
mitigating measures, five critical passages or facts from the Sutton opinion
support the approach this Article suggests. Because of these five statements and
facts, courts should be willing to evaluate plaintiffs in their unmitigated
condition if they are not using such mitigating or corrective measures, and
these courts should not be concerned that they are disregarding the Supreme
must be taken into
Court's pronouncements in Sutton that mitigating measures
143
consideration when making the disability determination.
the "if' language from Sutton;'44 (2)
The five statements and facts are (1)
the "might," "could," or "would" passage from Sutton; 45 (3) the
"individualized inquiry" language from Sutton;1 46 (4) the "actually faces"
language from Sutton; 147 and (5) the fact that all plaintiffs in the Sutton trilogy
did indeed use mitigating measures. 148 Because of these five aspects of Sutton,

140. Id. at 489-94. Interestingly, the plaintiffs may have lost this case because of attorney
strategy. Specifically, the Court noted that the petitioners only alleged that they were regarded
as being substantially limited in the major life activity of working and did not argue that they
were regarded as being substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing. Id. at 490. While
the Court noted that the petitioners did not make this "obvious argument," it did not comment
on the probability of success of such an argument. Id.
141. Id. at 491-94.
142. Id. at495. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens argued that the plaintiffs in Sutton
did indeed have disabilities. 527 U.S. at 513. He reached this conclusion, in part, because of
the legislative history behind the Act and the fact that the executive agencies that had been
charged with interpreting the Act had agreed that mitigating measures should not be looked at
when making the disability determination. Id. at 499-503.
143. In addition to the statements and facts that will be addressed in this section, plaintiffs
in this situation can also make the same "plain language of the statute" argument that the Court
applied in Sutton. Specifically, because a plaintiff who is not using available mitigating measures
has a physical or mental impairment that substantiallylimits (present indicative verb form) one
or more of the plaintiff's major life activities, the plain language of the statute permits him to fall
within the statutory definition of having a disability. As was addressed previously, this type of
plain language argument was applied by the Court in Sutton when it concluded that someone
who does use mitigating measures to correct an impairment does not have an impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity. See supra text accompanying notes 132-37.
144. 527 U.S. at 482.
145. Id. at 482-83.
146. Id. at 483.
147. Id. at 488.
148. Id.
at 475; Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 519 (1999); Albertson's, Inc.
v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565 (1999).
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courts should not be concerned that evaluating plaintiffs in an unmitigated state
if they do not use mitigating measures will contradict the Supreme Court's
holding in Sutton.49
1. The "If' Languagefrom the Sutton Opinion
Although not directlycommenting on the issue involved in this Article, the
Court did touch on the issue of whether plaintiffs should be evaluated in a
mitigated or corrected state, even if they are not presently using mitigating or
corrective measures. Specifically, although some post-Sutton cases seem to
have missed (or have decided to selectively ignore) this part of the opinion, the
Court indicated that mitigating measures should be taken into consideration if
they are being used. 50 When reaching its ultimate conclusion in this case, the
Court stated that
it is apparent that ifa person is taking measures to correct for,
or mitigate, a physical or mental impairment, the effects of
those measures-both positive and negative-must be taken
into account when judging whether that person is
"substantially limited" in a major life activity and thus
"disabled" under the Act.'
Of course, in Sutton, as well as in the two other cases in the Sutton trilogy, the
plaintiffs were indeed using the available mitigating measures."12
Despite this "if' language, as will be addressed later in this Article, many
courts since the Sutton decision have either required plaintiffs to use available
3
mitigating measures or have essentially punished them for not doing so.

Thus, instead of giving meaning to the "if' language in Sutton, some courts
read that word out of the Court's opinion.

149. In their article, Professors Burke and Abel also concluded that some of these excerpts

of the Sutton opinion might permit a pro-employee outcome when the employee does not use
mitigating measures. See Burke & Abel, supra note 22, at 811.

150. 527 U.S. at 482.
151. Id. at 482 (emphasis added). For an analysis of how the "side effects" language from
Sutton might apply to ADA cases, see Lauren J. McGarity, Note, Disabling Corrections and

CorrectableDisabilities:Why Side Effects Might be the Saving Grace of Sutton, 109 YALE L.J.
1161 (2000).
152. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 519; Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 565.
153. See Hewitt v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 183, 189 (N.D.N.Y. 2001)
(concluding that a plaintiff who suffered from post traumatic stress disorder did not have a
disability within the meaning of the Act because, with medication, which the plaintiff did not
take, he was not substantially limited in any major life activities); Tangires v. Johns Hopkins
Hosp., 79 F.Supp. 2d 587, 596 (D.Md. 2000), aff'd, 230 F.3d 1354 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that
plaintiff was not disabled because, had she used the available medication, her asthma would not
have substantially limited her in any major life activity).
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2. The "Might," "Could," or "Would" Languagefrom Sutton
The second portion of the Sutton opinion allowing for the approach
suggested in this Article is the "might," "could," or "would" language from the
opinion. 4 Specifically, when addressing the fact that the term "substantially
limits" was in the present indicative form of the verb, the Court noted:
[W]e think the language is properly read as requiring that a
person be presently-not potentially or
hypothetically-substantially limited in order to demonstrate
a disability. A "disability" exists only where an impairment
"substantially limits" a major life activity, not where it
"might," "could," or "would" be substantially limiting if
mitigating measures were not taken. A person whose physical
or mental impairment is corrected by medication or other
measures does not have an impairment that presently
"substantially limits" a major life activity.'55
This passage from Sutton contains several key points. First, the Court did
not want the Act to cover individuals with "hypothetical" or "potential"
disabilities. 15 6 This concern is inapplicable to plaintiffs who do not avail
themselves of mitigating measures and therefore suffer the full effects of their
mental or physical impairments. Specifically, in cases where individuals are not
using a mitigating measure, they are not "hypothetically" or "potentially"
substantially limited; they are actually substantially limited.
Second, the Court noted that an impairment is not covered under the Act
if the impairment "might," "could," or "would" be substantially limiting if
mitigating measures were not taken.1 57 Again, the use of the word "if' should
allow courts to evaluate uncorrected or unmitigated plaintiffs in their
uncorrected or unmitigated state. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the
Court used the present indicative of the form of the verb "to be" when writing
that "a person whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by mitigating
measures" does not have a disability.'58 Because the plaintiffs who do not use
medication or any other mitigating measure do have conditions that are not
currently corrected by medication, once again, courts should not feel compelled
to apply Sutton to these cases. Despite these distinguishing features of the
Sutton opinion, many courts are still relying on that opinion to rule in favor of

154. 527 U.S. at 482.
155. Id. at 482-83 (emphasis added).

156. Id.
157. Id. at 482.
158. Id. at 483 (emphasis added).
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employers when plaintiffs decide not to avail themselves of available
mitigating measures. 5 9
3. The IndividualizedInquiry Languagefrom Sutton
In Sutton the Court provided another passage that should allow courts to
follow the approach suggested in this Article. Specifically, relying on its
previous discussion in Bragdon v. Abbott, 6' the Court observed that "It]he
definition of disability also requires that disabilities be evaluated 'with respect
to an individual' and be determined based on whether an impairment
61
substantially limits the 'major life activities of such individual."
This language provides yet another reason why courts should not feel
constrained to evaluate plaintiffs in their mitigated or corrected condition if
they are not using mitigating measures. Specifically, if courts were to look at
individualized plaintiffs who were not using mitigating measures, it would be
clear that those particular individuals were substantially limited in the major
life activity at issue. Admittedly, this suggested approach could result in two
people with the same condition receiving different treatment under the Act;
however, courts have expressed on numerous occasions
that such an
62
individualized inquiry is precisely what the Act requires.1
4. The "Actually Faces1 63 Languagefrom Sutton
Another aspect of the Sutton opinion suggests that courts can decide to
evaluate plaintiffs in an unmitigated condition when the plaintiffs are not
availing themselves of mitigating measures. Specifically, in response to a point
made in the dissenting opinion, the Court observed that "[t]he use or nonuse of
a corrective device does not determine whether an individual is disabled; that
determination depends on whether the limitations an individual with an
impairment actuallyfaces are in fact substantially limiting. '

159. See Hein v. All America Plywood Co., 232 F.3d 482,487 (6th Cir. 2000) (concluding
that the plaintiff did not have a disability because he was at fault for not using medication to help
his hypertension); Hewitt v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 183, 189 (N.D.N.Y. 2001)
(following Tangires and concluding that plaintiff who suffered from post traumatic stress
disorder did not have a disability within the meaning of the Act because with medication, which
the plaintiff did not take, he was not substantially limited in any major life activities); Tangires
v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 587, 596 (D. Md. 2000), aff'd, 230 F.3d 1354 (4th Cir.
2000) (holding that plaintiff was not disabled because, had she used the available medication,
her asthma would not have substantially limited her in any major life activity).
160. 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (addressing whether an HIV-positive individual has a disability
under the Act even if that person did not have any symptoms of AIDS).
161. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000)).
162. For cases that have indicated that a case-by-case approach is appropriate in ADA
cases, see supra note 23.
163. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488.
164. Id. (second emphasis added).
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Applying this language to cases where plaintiffs do not use mitigating
measures and suffer the effects of that decision, it should be clear that those
individuals do "actually face" limitations on their major life activities. For
example, if the plaintiffs in Sutton did not use their corrective lenses, they
certainly would have actuallyfaced a substantial limitation in their ability to
see.' 65 Likewise, other plaintiffs who elect not to use mitigating measures
actuallyface substantial limitations in their major life activities. Therefore,
although many courts are reading Sutton to require an evaluation of a plaintiff
in a mitigated condition even when he is not in such a condition, this passage
is yet another one from Sutton that should allow courts to feel justified in
refusing to apply Sutton to unmitigated plaintiffs.
5.

The Plaintiffs in the Sutton Trilogy All Employed Mitigating
Measures

In addition to the four passages discussed above, which provide a legal
basis for reading Sutton in a way that would allow courts to evaluate
uncorrected or unmitigated plaintiffs in their uncorrected or unmitigated state,
there is also a factual reason why courts should not be concerned that
evaluating an uncorrected or unmitigated plaintiff in his uncorrected or
unmitigated condition would go against the Court's holdings in the Sutton
trilogy. In the three cases making up the Sutton trilogy, all plaintiffs availed
themselves of mitigating measures, thereby making those cases distinguishable
from the situation addressed by this Article. Specifically, the plaintiffs in Sutton
wore corrective lenses; 66 the plaintiff inMurphyused medication to control his
high blood pressure;67 and the plaintiff in Albertson's used a coping
mechanism his brain developed to compensate for his impairment. 6 Because
all plaintiffs in the Sutton trilogy availed themselves of mitijating measures,
this fact should be sufficient to allow courts to distinguish those cases from the
ones in which the plaintiffs did not avail themselves of the available mitigating
measures. 69 Therefore, if a court is uncomfortable going against the "broad"
interpretation of Sutton, there are certainly ample legal and factual justifications
that would allow courts to do so without running afoul of the Court's holdings
in the Sutton trilogy.

165. See id.

166. Id. at 475.
167. Murphy, 527 U.S. at 519. This case will be discussed in greater detail, see infra Part
IV.C.
168. 527 U.S. at 565. This case will be discussed in greater detail, see infra Part IV.D.
169. For a court making this point, see Finical v. Collections Unlimited, Inc., 65 F. Supp.

2d 1032, 1037-38 (D. Ariz. 1999) (holding that plaintiff who did not avail herself of mitigating
measures had a disability under the ADA because, in her actual, unmitigated state, she was
substantially limited in a major life activity).
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C. The Murphy Opinion
On the same day it decided Sutton, the Court also decided Murphy v.
United ParcelService, Inc.170 In Murphy, as in Sutton, the Court ruled in favor
of the defendant-employer and concluded that courts must take into account a
plaintiffs mitigating measures when determining whether that individual has
an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. 71
The employee in Murphy was a mechanic who suffered from high blood
However, when taking proper medication, he was able to
pressure.'
participate in activities in which other individuals could engage without any
significant restrictions.173 Although his blood pressure exceeded DOT standards
for the position in question, Murphy was erroneously granted certification and
United Parcel Service hired him. 74 Eventually, after United Parcel Service
realized Murphy's blood pressure was above DOT regulations, it terminated his
employment.'
Murphy filed suit under the Act, alleging that United Parcel Service
' The United States District Court for
violated the Act when it terminated him. 76
the District of Kansas granted summary judgment in favor of United Parcel
Service, holding that Murphy did not have a disability because with his
' The district
medication he was only limited in his ability to lift heavy objects. 77
court also rejected his "regarded as" argument.' The Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit affirmed, also concluding that in his medicated state, Murphy
was not substantially limited in performing any major life activities. '" As was
the case in Sutton, the plaintiff in Murphy also availed himself of the mitigating
measure available to correct his physical impairment.'
The Supreme Court then issued its opinion in the case. Based on its
reasoning in Sutton, the Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's judgment and held
that mitigating measures must be taken into account when determining whether
an individual has a disability under the Act.' 8' Specifically, the Court observed
the following:

170. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
171. Id. at 518-19.

172. Id. at 519.

173. Id.
174. Id. at 519-20.
175. Id. at 520.
176. Murphy, 527 U.S. at 520.
177. Id. The district court's opinion can be found in Murphy v. United ParcelService, Inc.,
946 F. Supp. 872 (D. Kan. 1996).
178. Murphy, 527 U.S. at 520.
179. Id. The Tenth Circuit opinion can be found in Murphy v. UnitedParcelService, Inc.,
141 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1999).
180. Murphy, 527 U.S. at 519.
181. Id. at 521.
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The first question presented in this case is whether the
determination of petitioner's disability is made with reference
to mitigating measures he employs. We have answered that
question in Sutton in the affirmative. Given that holding, the
result in this case is clear. The Court of Appeals concluded
that, when medicated, petitioner's high blood pressure does
not substantially limit him in any major life
activity.... Consequently, we conclude that the Court of
Appeals correctly affirmed the grant of summary judgment in
respondent's favor on the claim that petitioner is substantially
limited in one or more major life activities and thus disabled
under the ADA." 2
As was the case in Sutton, this portion of the Murphy opinion can also be
used to support the proposition that plaintiffs who do not use mitigating
measures should not be evaluated as if they did use such measures.
Specifically, the Court used the present indicative form of the verb "employ,"
allowing for the argument that if an individual is not employing mitigating
measures, the mitigating measures should not be taken into consideration in the
determination of whether that individual does indeed have a disability under the
Act.'83 Despite this possible interpretation, very few courts have followed this
reasoning.
The Court also rejected Murphy's argument that he was "regarded as"
substantially limited in his ability to work.184 As was the case in Sutton, Justices
Stevens and Breyer dissented. s5
Both Sutton and Murphy reached the same conclusion: because the
plaintiffs were availing themselves of measures that corrected their
impairments, they were not entitled to protection under the ADA.8 6 Since these
cases and Albertson 's, which will be discussed in the next section of this
Article, courts have broadened these opinions to preclude individuals from
gaining protection of the Act even if they are not availing themselves of
available mitigating measures and are suffering from the effects of their
impairments-an issue that was not directly addressed by the Court in either
Sutton, Murphy, or Albertson 's.

182. Id. (emphasis added).

183. Id.
184. Id. at 521-25.
185. Id. at 525. The dissenting opinion was very brief and only indicated that the two
Justices were dissenting for the same reasons they did in Sutton. Murphy, 527 U.S. at 525
(Stevens, J., dissenting). In fact, the Justices believed this was an easier case than Sutton because
of their belief that the plaintiff s impairment, severe hypertension, "easily falls within the ADA's
nucleus of covered impairments." Id.
186. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 519.
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D. The Albertson's Opinion
The final case in the Sutton trilogy is Albertson 's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg.'87
In Albertson's the Court addressed several ADA-related questions, one of
which involved the issue of whether an individual whose body had developed
a mechanism for dealing with and correcting a physical impairment meets the
definition of having a disability under the Act.' 88
The plaintiff, Kirkingburg, had applied for a truck-driving position with the
employer, Albertson's, and, despite not meeting the federal standard for sight
for that particular position, he was hired. 8 9 After an injury and subsequent
vision examination, the plaintiff was not allowed to come back to work because
the examining physician correctly concluded that Kirkingburg's eyesight did
not meet the federal standard. 9 ° Although he was eligible for a waiver of this
requirement and eventually received one, Albertson's refused to rehire him.' 9'
Kirkingburg sued Albertson's under the ADA. 9 2 In its motion for summary
judgment, Albertson's argued that Kirkingburg was not otherwise qualified to
perform his truck-driving responsibilities.' 93 The district court granted the
motion for summary judgment, ruling that Albertson's reasonably concluded
that Kirkingburg could not meet the federal visual acuity standards.'94 The
district court ruled that Albertson's was not required to allow Kirkingburg time
to get the waiver as a reasonable accommodation. 95 The Ninth Circuit
reversed.' 96
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court first addressed the
issue of whether Kirkingburg did indeed suffer from a disability within the
meaning of the Act.' 97 The Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit made three
errors when it analyzed the issue of whether the plaintiff suffered from a
disability.'98 After acknowledging that Kirkingburg did suffer from an
impairment (a vision impairment) 99 and that the impairment affected a major

187. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
188. Id. at 565-66.
189. Id. at 558-59.
190. Id. at 559.
191. Id. at 559-60.
192. Id. at 560.
193. Albertson 's, 527 U.S. at 560-61.
194. Id. at 561.
195. Id.
196. Id. The Ninth Circuit's opinion can be found atKirkingburgv. Albertson 's, Inc., 143
F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1998). The Ninth Circuit "conclud[ed] that because Kirkingburg had
presented 'uncontroverted evidence' that his vision was effectively monocular, he had
demonstrated that 'the mannerin which he sees differs significantly from the mannerin which
most people see.' That difference in manner . . . was sufficient to establish disability."
Albertson 's, 527 U.S. at 561 (quoting Kirkingburg, 143 F.3d at 1232).
197. Albertson 's, 527 U.S. at 562.
198. Id. at 564-67.
199. Id. at 563.
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life activity (seeing),20 0 the Court then addressed whether the impairment
substantiallylimited his major life activity of seeing.20 '
The Court noted that "the Ninth Circuit was too quick to find a
disability. '20 2 The Court thought the Ninth Circuit equated the phrase
"significant restriction" with "mere difference" and was therefore too quick in
concluding that Kirkingburg had a disability.20 3 Specifically, the Court
emphasized that merely because an individual might not be able to perform a
major life activity as well as other people, that difference does not equate to a
disability under the Act.2 4 Furthermore, the Court indicated that the limitation
major life activity must be substantial and not merely a
on the individual's
25
slight inability.

Second, and most relevant to the issue involved in this Article, the Court
criticized the Ninth Circuit's decision to disregard an individual's ability to
compensate for the impairment.20 6 Specifically, because Kirkingburg's brain
had developed a method to compensate for his visual impairment, the lower
court should have used that fact to determine whether he was substantially
limited in his ability to see.20 7 The Court reasoned that under Sutton, mitigating
measures should be taken into consideration when determining whether an
individual has a disability; there should be no distinction between "artificial"
mitigating measures, such as glasses or prostheses, and mitigating measures
one's own body uses or creates to correct a physical impairment.2 8 Finally, the
Court reasoned that the Ninth Circuit was too quick to conclude Kirkingburg
him as an individual, on a
had a disability because the court did not evaluate
20 9
case-by-case basis, as required by the Act.

The Albertson's opinion is the final piece in the Sutton trilogy. In pertinent
part, it stands for the proposition that mitigating measures, particularly those
that are "natural" devices created and utilized by an individual's body, must
also be evaluated when looking at whether an individual satisfies the Act's
definition of a disability." However, the Court did not address the specific
issue of whether employers (and courts) can evaluate plaintiffs in a corrected
or mitigated state even if they are not in one. Both before and after Sutton,
various courts attempted to answer this question, and there have been different

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 564.
Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 564-65.
Id. at 563-66.

205. Id. at 565.
206. Id. at 565-66.

207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 566-67.
210. Id. at 565-66.
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outcomes to this situation.2 t It is this confusion that leaves plaintiffs in medical
and legal limbo, not knowing what legal and professional consequences their
medical decisions will have.
V. ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
A.

Pre-SuttonCases Where Courts RequiredPlaintiffsto Use Mitigating
Measures

Even before the Supreme Court handed down its decisions in the Sutton
trilogy, various lower courts had been dealing with cases where ADA plaintiffs
sued their employers after deciding not to use available measures that would
have corrected or alleviated their impairments.21 2 Many of these courts took the
pro-employer stance and evaluated these plaintiffs in a corrected state, even
though it was not the state in which the plaintiffs actually existed." 3
One such pro-employer case that addressed the specific issue of whether
to evaluate a plaintiff in a mitigated condition even if he is not actually using
available mitigating measures was Pangalosv. PrudentialInsuranceCompany
ofAmerica. 4 Pangalosinvolved an individual with severe ulcerative colitis
who sued his former employer under the Act."1 5 The plaintiffs medical
211. Compare Hein v. All America Plywood Co., 232 F.3d 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2000)
(concluding that the plaintiff did not have a disability because he was at fault for not using
medication to help his hypertension), Hewitt v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 183,
189 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (following Tangires,infra,and concluding that plaintiffwho suffered from
post traumatic stress disorder did not have a disability within the meaning of the Act because
with medication, which the plaintiff did not take, he was not substantially limited in any major
life activities), Tangires v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 587, 596 (D. Md. 2000)
(holding that plaintiff was not disabled because, had she used the available medication, her
asthma would not have substantially limited her in any major life activity), aff'd, 230 F.3d 1354
(4th Cir. 2000), Bowers v. Multimedia Cablevision, Inc., No. 96-1298-JTM, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19319, at *I1 (D. Kan. Nov. 3, 1998) (concluding that a plaintiff who suffered from
depression but who did not take prescribed medication did not have a disability within the
meaning of the Act), and Pangalos v. Prudential Ins. Co., No. 96-0167, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15749, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 1996) (holding that plaintiff who did not avail himself of
mitigating measures did not have a viable claim under the ADA), with Finical v. Collections
Unlimited, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1032,1036-44 (D. Ariz. 1999) (holding that even though plaintiff
refused to employ mitigating measures, she had a disability under the ADA because, in her
unmitigated condition, she was substantially limited in her major life activity).
212. See Bowers, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19319, at *11 (concluding that a plaintiff who
suffered from depression but who did not take prescribed medication did not have a disability
within the meaning of the Act); Haworth v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6625, at *17-18 (D. Kan. April 30, 1998) (noting that because the plaintiff was not actually
employing mitigating measures, the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Sutton was not directly
applicable); Pangalos,1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15749, at *8 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding thatplaintiff
who did not avail himself of mitigating measures did not have a viable claim under the ADA).
213. See Bowers, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19319, at *8; Pangalos,1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15749, at *8.
214. 1996 U.S. Dist LEXIS 15749, at *8.
215. Id. at* 1-2.
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condition caused him to suffer from severe attacks of uncontrollable diarrhea,
hemorrhoids, andbloody stools." 6 The only permanent solution to this problem
7
was the surgical removal of the colon. Because of the radical nature of such9
2 ' the plaintiff did not want to take this "drastic alternative.""
a "cure,"
According to the plaintiff, his employer violated the Act because it failed to
220
make a reasonable accommodation for his condition.
After addressing the symptoms of the plaintiffs condition and the
accommodations he requested (such as providing him with a speciallyequipped vehicle or transferring him to a position that did not require travel),"
the court in Pangalosaddressed the issue of whether the plaintiff did indeed
suffer from a disability within the meaning of the Act." Although not directly
reaching an answer to this question, the court acknowledged that the plaintiff
could have alleviated his impairment through surgery."23 Additionally, the court
chastised the plaintiff for not "seriously considering" the use of a diaper or
other device that would have helped alleviate any emergency resulting from a
sudden attack of diarrhea. 2 4 In its ultimate conclusion, the court determined
that either the plaintiff was not disabled "because the disabling condition he
25
allege[d] could readily be remedied surgically," or that the plaintiff was not
2 6 However, the court did note that the
a qualified individual with a disability.
plaintiff was the only one who could decide whether he would undergo the
surgery." 7 Of course, the court implied that if the plaintiff was unwilling to opt
22
for this surgery, he would lose protection of the Act. This pre-Sutton,
extremely pro-employer case was just one decision that held ADA plaintiffs to

216. Id. at *1. For more information about this medical condition, see HARRISON'S

PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 1633-1645 (Anthony S. Fauci et al. eds., 14th ed. 1998)
(1958) [hereinafter HARRISON'S].

217. Pangalos,1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15749 at *3.Patients are then required to wear a
colostomy bag and remove waste through a surgically opened hole in the patient's abdomen. For
more information about this surgical alternative, see HARRISON'S, supra note 216, at 1644.
218. See HARRISON'S, supra note 216, at 1644.
219. Pangalos, 1996 U.S. Dist LEXIS 15749, at *3.
220. Id. at *2.
221. Id. at *3-4. The court also addressed the accommodations that the employer had
offered to the plaintiff, such as offering to provide him with a portable toilet, offering the

plaintiff the opportunity to interview for other positions within the company in the Kentucky
area, and looking for other positions within the company that did not require travel. Id. at *4-5.
222. Id. at *5-6.
223. Id. at *6.

224. Pangalos, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15749, at *8. The plaintiff contended that he did
not want to use an adult diaper to help his problem because the use of such a device would be
too uncomfortable because it would require him to sit in his own excrement, which would result
in rashes. Id.
225. Id. at*8.
226. Id.

227. Id. at *7.
228. Id. at *7-8.
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this high standard and looked at plaintiffs in corrected or mitigated conditions
even when they were not in such a condition.
Another pre-Sutton case in which a plaintiff did not avail himself of
available mitigating measures was Bowers v. Multimedia Cablevision,Inc. 229
In Bowers the court was asked to determine whether an individual suffering
from major depression, but who voluntarily refused to take medication to
control his depression, suffered from a disability within the meaning of the
Act. 230 Relying on the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Sutton, the court concluded
the plaintiff did not satisfy the Act's definition of disability.2 1' The court also
indicated that it was ruling in favor of the employer because even if the plaintiff
was able to prove that he had a disability under the Act, the employer properly
terminated him. 232
As expected, when addressing the issue of whether the plaintiff had a
disability under the Act, the court in Bowers first looked :at the definition of
disability under the Act and the most recent case law interpreting that
definition. 233 The plaintiff had argued that he suffered from a mental
impairment that substantially limited his ability to function in social settings
and to move around in public.234 The court then concluded, for purposes of the
pending motion, that those activities were major life activities and that the
plaintiffs condition, if left untreated, substantially limited him in those
activities. 235 However, the plaintiffs case failed once the court looked at the
Tenth Circuit's opinion in Sutton.236
Specifically, the court looked at the Tenth Circuit's language from Sutton
that "a plaintiff must prove his condition substantially limits a major life
activity even after medication or other corrective or mitigating measures that
the plaintiff uses are taken into account. ' ' 237 The court then noted the following:
In this case, it is undisputed that plaintiff s condition does
not substantially limit him in his major life activities when he
takes his medication as prescribed. In fact, his one panic
attack occurred after he had quit taking his medication
without so informing his doctor. The plaintiff cannot gain
229. No. 96-1298-JTM, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19319 (D. Kan. Nov. 3, 1998).
230.
Id. at

11-12.

231. Id.
232. Id. at 12.
233. Id. at *9-12.
234. Id. at*10-11.
235. Bowers, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19319, at *10-11.
236. Id. at *11.
237. Id. (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997)).
Although this was obviously not from the Supreme Court's opinion in Sutton, the Tenth Circuit's
opinion also uses the present indicative form of the verb "uses," which could be read as
suggesting that plaintiffs who do not use mitigating measures should not be covered by the
holdings from cases in which the plaintiffs did indeed use mitigating or corrective measures. See
Sutton, 130 F.3d at 902.
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ADA protection by unilaterally deciding, without
justification, not to use prescribed medication which corrects
or alleviates his condition.238
Therefore, the court was placing a burden on an ADA plaintiff to take
affirmative steps to remove himself from the protection of the Act.239 As a
result of placing this burden on potential ADA plaintiffs, plaintiffs are much
less likely to prevail on their ADA claims.
Unlike the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Pangalosand the District of
Kansas in Bowers, a pre-Sutton court that appeared willing to take a more
sympathetic, pro-plaintiff approach to this specific issue was the United States
District Court for the District of Kansas in Haworth v. Procter & Gamble
Manufacturing Co.2' 4 In Haworth an individual suffering from cervical
radiculopathy24 ' brought suit against his former employer, alleging violations
of the Act.2 42 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged his employer treated him
differently, eventually terminated him, and refused to make a reasonable
the
accommodation for him because of his disability.2 43 After some discussion,
24
district court granted summary judgment in the defendant's favor.
However, the court did not base its decision on the mitigating measures
issue, but rather reached its conclusion after evaluating other flaws in the

238. Bowers, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19319, at * 11. The above passage does provide some
hope for future plaintiffs in this predicament. Specifically, because the court indicated that the
plaintiff did not have justification for not using mitigating measures, perhaps a future court will
interpret that statement to mean that if there is an adequate justification for refusing mitigating
measures, then that person might be protected under the Act.
239. In another pre-Sutton case, the court in Testerman v. Chrysler Corp., No. 95-240
MMS, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21392, at *27-54 (D. Del. Dec. 30, 1997), addressed whether the
plaintiff, who suffered from a back injury, depression, diabetes, and alcoholism, satisfied the
definition of "disability" under the Act. After analyzing whether mitigating measures should be
evaluated when determining whether a plaintiff can satisfy this definition, the court then looked
at the the plaintiff's own failure to closely monitor his diabetes. Id. at *33-37. The court noted
that the defendant "has raised a genuine dispute as to whether [plaintiff's] diabetes would have
been substantially limiting if it had been more diligently treated." Id. at *49. This statement
suggests that the plaintiff might lose protection under the Act if the defendant were able to show
that if the plaintiff used the mitigating measures correctly, his condition would not have
substantially limited any major life activity. However, the court did acknowledge that, had the
reason for the plaintiff's failure to carefully treat his diabetes been based on another impairment,
he would still be covered under the Act. Id.
240. No. 97-2149-EEO, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6625 (D. Kan. Apr. 30, 1998).
241. Cervical radiculopathy is a disorder in which the patient experiences sharp back pain
that radiates from the spine to the leg. The patient commonly experiences muscle spasms
producing this sharp pain during common activities such as standing and ambulation. The muscle
spasms also limit the patient's ability to bend forward. See HARRISON'S, supra note 216, at 7476.
242. Haworth, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6625, at *9, 13. The plaintiff also alleged his
employer terminated him in response to his filing of a workers' compensation claim. Id. at *26.
243. Id. at *20-23.
244. Id. at *31-32.
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plaintiffs case.245 Specifically, the court ruled in favor of the defendantemployer because the plaintiff was not able to demonstrate that he was
substantially limited in the major life activity of working.2" In addition, the
court concluded that the plaintiff was unable to prove that he was substantially
limited in the major life activity of sleeping. 2 7 Finally, the court also rejected
the plaintiffs claim because he was unable to establish a causal connection
between his disability and the alleged acts of disability-based discrimination.24 8
When addressing the mitigating measures issue, the court recognized that
the plaintiff could have used medications and other measures to mitigate his
condition. 249 Based on the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Sutton, the employer
argued that because the plaintiff's condition could have been treated with pain
killers and epidural shots, he did not suffer from a disability.250 On the other
hand, the plaintiff argued that he did suffer from a disability under the Act
because his physical impairment caused him to be substantially limited in his
ability to work and sleep.25'
Reading the Tenth Circuit's Sutton opinion in a more narrow way than that
urged by the defendant,252 the court in Haworth noted that the plaintiff did not
utilize the available mitigating measures; therefore, the Tenth Circuit's opinion
in Sutton was not directly on point.253 The court also made a point of indicating
that the plaintiff was not taking the available mitigating measures because of
financial reasons.25 4 Specifically, the court observed:

It is an undisputed fact, for purposes of summary
judgment, that plaintiff, due to lack of income and health
insurance, has often gone months without adequate
medication, and has put off additional doctor's treatments
such as epidural blocks. Thus, the facts do not support the

245. See id. at *17-18.
246. Id. at*18-19.
247. Haworth, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6625, at *19.
248. Id. at *19-20.
249. Id. at *9, 17-18.
250. Id. at * 17. Interestingly, the defendant used the following language from the Tenth
Circuit's opinion in Sutton:
The determination of whether an individual's impairment substantially
limits a major life activity should take into consideration mitigating or
corrective measures utilized by the individual. In making disability

determinations, we are concerned with whether the impairment affects the
individual in fact, not whether it would hypothetically affect the individual

without the use of corrective measures.
Id. (quoting Sutton, 130 F.3d at 902) (emphasis added).
251. Id. at *9, 17.
252. The defendant attempted to convince the court that the Tenth Circuit's ruling in Sutton
required courts to evaluate the plaintiff with the use of mitigating measures, even if those
measures were not being utilized by the plaintiff. Haworth, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6625, at * 17.

253. Id. at*18.
254. Id.
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conclusion that plaintiff "utilized" corrective measures.
Sutton does not directly address the situation presented here.
We hesitate to read Sutton as broadly as defendant, and
therefore cannot conclude, as defendant does, that the holding
in Sutton "conclusively establishes" that plaintiff does not
have a disability. 5
Therefore, although the court in Haworth did not ultimately rule in favor
of the plaintiff, it did indeed express some sympathy toward the plaintiff and
his inability to use mitigating measures.256 Unlike PangalosandBowers, where
the courts looked at mitigating measures even though the plaintiff was not
using them, the Haworth court took a more restrictive view of the Tenth
Circuit's opinion in Sutton. It distinguished a case when, although available, the
plaintiff was not using the mitigating measure and therefore was suffering from
the effects of his impairment; however, the Haworth court did not seem to
require the plaintiff to use the mitigating measures in order to obtain the Act's
protection, nor was it ready to penalize the plaintiff for making the decision not
to use them.2" 7

Therefore, as the conflicting opinions in Pangalos,Bowers, and Haworth
indicate, before the Sutton trilogy, there was a question as to how to treat these
ADA plaintiffs when they did not use available mitigating measures. Although
the Court likely assumed that its decisions in Sutton, Murphy, and Albertson's
would clear up this confusion, such certainty has not occurred in the three years
since these opinions were handed down.
B. Post-Sutton Cases
Although the Supreme Court made it clear that the mitigating measures
employees actually use must be taken into consideration when determining
whether the individuals suffer from a disability under the Act, 25 9 the Court did
not address the precise situation that is the focus of this Article. Nonetheless,
some courts have read the Sutton trilogy quite broadly and have concluded that
regardless of whether the individual is utilizing the available mitigating

255. Id. at* 17-18.
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. As will be discussed later in this Article, not all courts agree as to how the Sutton
trilogy applies to this particular situation. Compare Tangires v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 79 F.
Supp. 2d 587, 596 (D. Md. 2000) (holding that plaintiff did not have a disability under the ADA
because, had she used the available medication, her condition would not have substantially
limited her in any of her major life activities), aff'd, 230 F.3d 1354 (4th Cir. 2000), with Finical
v. Collections Unlimited, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1036-44 (D. Ariz. 1999) (holding that even
though plaintiff refused to employ mitigating measures, she had a disability under the ADA
because in her unmitigated condition she was substantially limited in her major life activities).
259. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488.
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measure, it must be looked at when determining disability status.2 60 Although
not all courts have reached this pro-employer conclusion, 261 many courts have
answered this question in this manner since Sutton. As a result, the proemployer momentum of the Sutton trilogy seems to be picking up speed and
could cause many plaintiffs who have current, actual disabilities (as opposed
to potential or hypothetical disabilities) to lose protection of the Act. The
approach proposed in this Article would put the brakes on the pro-employer
Sutton momentum and would strike a reasonable balance between the needs of
employers and employees.
1. Courts Adopting a Broad Interpretationof Sutton
One of the first post-Sutton cases to reach a United States court of appeals
on the issue of whether mitigating measures should be used in the
determination of whether an individual has a disability under the Act, even
when the individual is not using such measures, was Tangiresv. Johns Hopkins
Hospital.262 In Tangiresthe plaintiff was a long-time asthma sufferer who was
suing under the Act and alleging that her employer failed to provide her with
a reasonable accommodation, refused to promote her, and eventually
terminated her as a result of her disability. 63 In addition to suffering from
asthma, the plaintiff also had a pituitary adenoma, which was a type of
tumor. 264 The plaintiff's doctors had prescribed two types of treatment for her
asthma: inhaled steroids and bronchodialators. 265 Despite the fact that her
doctors prescribed the steroids, the plaintiff was reluctant to use them out of

260. See Hein v. All America Plywood Co., 232 F.3d 482,487 (6th Cir. 2000) (concluding
that the plaintiffdid not have a disability because he was at fault for not using medication to help
his hypertension); Hewitt v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 183, 189 (N.D.N.Y. 2001)
(following Tangires and concluding that plaintiff who suffered from post traumatic stress
disorder did not have a disability within the meaning of the Act because with medication, which
the plaintiff did not take, he was not substantially limited in any major life activities); Tangires
v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 587, 596 (D. Md. 2000) (holding that plaintiff was not
disabled because, had she used the available medication, her asthma would not have substantially
limited her in any major life activity), aff'd, 230 F.3d 1354 (4th Cir. 2000).
261. See Finical v. Collections Unlimited, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1036-44 (D. Ariz.
1999).
262. 79 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D. Md. 2000), af'd, 230 F.3d 1354 (4th Cir. 2000). Because the
opinion ofthe United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit contains very few facts and
no legal analysis, the facts and reasoning of this case are coming from the information contained
in the district court's opinion. In addition to the Fourth Circuit in Tangires, the Sixth Circuit
faced a similar situation and ruled, based on Murphy and Sutton, that an individual who did not
avail himself of available medication did not come within the protection of the Act. See Hein v.
All America Plywood Co., 232 F.3d 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2000) (concluding that the plaintiff did
not have a disability because he was at fault for not using medication to help his hypertension).
263. Tangires, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 589.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 595.
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fear that such use would affect her pituitary adenoma.265 There was testimonial
evidence from the plaintiffs treating physician that inhaled steroids are the
"gold standard" for the treatment of asthma and that the plaintiff would have
benefitted from such treatment.267
When addressing the threshold issue of whether the plaintiff suffered from
a disability under the Act, the court relied on Sutton andMurphyand concluded
that the plaintiff must be evaluated in her medicated state, even though she was
not using the steroids to control her impairment.268 Ironically (and curiously),
the court indicated that the determination must be made with reference to
mitigating measures that the plaintiff employs.269 The court then looked at
medical testimony that asthma could be controlled by medications (steroids)
and that the plaintiff was a difficult patient who at times refused to take the
medications.27
The court then concluded that the plaintiff s refusal to take the steroids was
based on a "subjective and unsubstantiated belief' that taking such medication
"
would adversely affect her other ailment.27
' In its ultimate conclusion on the
issue of whether the plaintiff suffered from a disability, the court decided that
because the plaintiff voluntarily refused to take the medication that could have
corrected her asthma, her asthma did not substantially limit her in any major
life activity.272 Therefore, the district court concluded that she did not have a
disability under the Act.27 a Specifically, the court observed:
On the record here, this Court concludes that plaintiff s
asthma was treatable and that during her employment she
intentionally failed to follow her physicians'
recommendations that she take steroid medication. Since
plaintiff s asthma is correctable by medication and since she
voluntarily refused the recommended medication, her asthma
did not substantially limit her in any major life activity.274

266. Id. at 595-96.
267. Id. at 596.
268. Id. at 595-96.
269. Tangires,79 F. Supp. 2d at 595. Of course, this is ironic because, unlike the plaintiffs
in Sutton and Murphy, the plaintiff in Tangireswas not employing the mitigating measure. Id.
at 595-96. Once again, the use of the word "employs" suggests that the critical inquiry should
be whether the plaintiff actually uses the mitigating measure. Nonetheless, the court ruled in
favor of the employer and concluded that the unmitigated plaintiff must be evaluated as if she
did indeed use mitigating measures. Id. at 595-96.
270. Id. at 595-96.
271. Id. at 596.
272. Id.
273. Tangires,79 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
274. Id. at 596. Although the court was not clear on this issue, one could possibly read this
case as not requiring a look at mitigating measures in all cases where plaintiffs do not avail
themselves of the mitigating measures. Specifically, because the court in Tangires commented
that the plaintiff was ignoring her doctor's advice and that she had an "unsubstantiated" fear of
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The Tangires court's conclusion that the plaintiff was not substantially
limited in any major life activity conflicted with various portions of Sutton.
Specifically, the court did not take into account the "if' language from
Sutton;275 it did not take into account the "might," "could," or "would"
language from Sutton;27 it did not use the individualized approach required by
Bragdon and Sutton;2 77 it did not apply the "actually faces" language from
Sutton;2 78 and it also failed to distinguish the case from the Sutton trilogy on the
basis that the plaintiffs in those cases availed themselves of the mitigating
measures,2 79 while the plaintiff in Tangires did not use the mitigating
measure.28 ° If the court had evaluated the plaintiff in her actual condition,
rather than in the condition in which she would have been had she followed her
doctor's advice, it would have most likely concluded that the plaintiff was
indeed substantially limited in a major life activity. In essence, the court was
speculating as to the condition in which the plaintiff would have been had she
taken the medication, which is the type of speculation the Supreme Court in
Sutton did not want courts to undertake. 1
In addition to ruling in favor of the employer on this issue, the Tangires
court also noted that an individual who does not avail herself of proper
treatment is not a "qualified individual" under the Act. 282 Therefore, the district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer.283 The United States

potential side effects of the recommended medication, perhaps in cases where a patient's fears
are not unsubstantiated or in a situation where there is some other legitimate justification for not
using the available mitigating measures, the court should not look at the mitigating measures.
See id.
275. 527 U.S. at 482-83. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 1.
276. Id. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
277. Id. at 483. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3.
278. Id. at 488. See discussion supra Part IV.B.4.
279. See discussion supra Part IV.B.5.
280. 79 F. Supp. 2d at 595-96.
281. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482-83.
282. 79 F. Supp. 2d at 596. Interestingly, the opinion on which the Tangires court relied
for this proposition was Roberts v. County ofFairfax, 937 F. Supp. 541, 549 (E.D. Va. 1996).
However, the federal regulation at issue in that case addressed an individual who refuses a
reasonable accommodation offered by an employer, not an individual who refuses a medical
option. In pertinent part, the C.F.R. section states:
A qualified individual with a disability is not required to accept an
accommodation, aid, service, opportunity or benefit which such qualified
individual chooses not to accept. However, if such individual rejects a
reasonable accommodation, aid, service, opportunity or benefit that is
necessary to enable the individual to perform the essential functions of the
position held or desired, and cannot, as a result of that rejection, perform
the essential functions of the position, the individual will not be considered
a qualified individual with a disability.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(d), quoted in Roberts, 937 F. Supp. at 547-48.
283. Tangires, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
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Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's
judgment." 4
Another pro-employer, post-Sutton case addressing a plaintiff who decided
not to take the required medicine for his condition was Spradley v. Custom
Campers, Inc.2" 5 In Spradley the plaintiff suffered from a disorder that caused
him to faint on numerous occasions while at work.286 One of the questions
before the court was whether this impairment. 7 constituted a disability within
the meaning of the Act.2"'
The court first concluded that the plaintiff's seizure disorder was indeed a
physical impairment under the Act.289 The court then indicated that it was going
to address whether the plaintiff identified any major life activity that was
substantially limited, but the court stopped short of doing so because it
concluded that when evaluating the plaintiff with respect to the available
mitigating measures, he would not have been substantially limited in his ability
to perform major life activities.290 Specifically, the court acknowledged that on
both occasions when he passed out at work, the plaintiff was not taking
Dilantin, the medicine prescribed by his physician to reduce the likelihood of
having a seizure.2 9

Relying on Murphy, the companion case to Sutton, the court noted in dicta
that the mitigating measures that were available to the plaintiff, even though he
did not use them, would be taken into account when determining whether the
plaintiff did indeed have a disability within the meaning of the Act.292
Specifically, the court noted that "if a disorder can be controlled by medication
or other corrective measures, it does not substantially limit a major life
activity. '293 Based on this reasoning, the court indicated that the plaintiff might
not have a disability under the Act.2 94 Ironically, the court pointed out that the
plaintiff's taking of Dilantin would not have necessarily eliminated the
seizures, but would have made them a less likely occurrence. 295 Therefore, the
court was speculating as to how the plaintiffs condition would have been
affected by the medication.
Once again, as did the court in Tangires, the court in this case was
apparently ignoring the Supreme Court's statements in, and the facts from, the
284.
285.
286.
287.
constitute
1232.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Tangires v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 230 F.3d 1354 (4th Cir. 2000).
68 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (D. Kan. 1999).
Id. at 1228.
Later in the opinion, the court concluded that the plaintiff's disorder did indeed
a physical impairment under the regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act. Id. at
Id. at 1231.
Id. at 1232.
Id. at 1232-33.
Spradley, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1232.
Id. at 1232-33.
Id. at 1232 (quoting Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 520-21 (1999)).
Id. at 1232-33.
Id. at 1233.
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cases in the Sutton trilogy. Specifically, the court did not take into account the
"if' language from Sutton;296 it did not take into account the "might," "could,"
or "would" language from Sutton;297 it did not use the individualized approach
required by Bragdon and Sutton;291 it did not apply the "actually faces"
language from Sutton;299 and italso failed to distinguish the case from the
Sutton trilogy on the basis that the plaintiffs in those cases availed themselves
of the mitigating measures, 0a 0 while the plaintiff in this case did not use the
mitigating measure.3 ' The Spradley court's reasoning further opens the door
to allowing courts to speculate about how an ADA plaintiffs body would
respond to various mitigating measures, something courts should not be in the
business of doing.
The most recent pro-employer, post-Sutton case that addressed this issue
was Hewitt v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.30 2 In Hewitt the plaintiff suffered from
post traumatic stress disorder and alleged that he was fired because of this
condition.3 3 The court first needed to address the question of whether the
plaintiff did indeed suffer from a disability and, thus, whether he was protected
by the Act.30 4
The court first determined that there was "little doubt" that post traumatic
stress disorder could indeed constitute an impairment.0 5 The court looked at the
symptoms of the disorder (depression, apprehension, paranoia, overreacting to
difficult situations, inability to sleep, and high blood pressure), and although
the plaintiff did not provide a medically substantiated diagnosis, the court
concluded for purposes of the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the
plaintiff indeed proved he suffered from an impairment.3 6
The court next addressed the issue of whether that impairment reached the
level of a disability under the Act.30 7 The plaintiff alleged that his unmedicated
post traumatic stress disorder was an impairment that substantially limited his
ability to work.30 8 The defendant argued that the plaintiff did not have a
disability under the Act, and even if he did have a disability under the Act, he
was discharged from his employment for a legitimate reason.30 9
Specifically referencing Sutton, the court indicated that "[a] disability
exists only where an impairment substantially limits a major life activity not
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

527 U.S. at 482-83. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 1.
Id. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
Id. at 483. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3.
Id. at 488. See discussion supra Part IV.B.4.
See discussion supra Part IV.B.5.
Spradley v. Custom Campers, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1232 (D. Kan. 1999).
185 F. Supp. 2d 183 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).
Id. at 186.
Id. at 188.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hewitt, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 189.
Id. at 188.
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where it might, could or would be substantially limiting if mitigating measures
were not taken."31 The court continued, stating that "[a] person whose physical
or mental impairment is corrected by medication or other measures does not
have an impairment that presently substantially limits a major life activity. ' 3"
The court then noted that even with medication, an individual could still have
a disability if the individual is substantially limited with the use of the
medication or corrective device.3 '2
The court then addressed the plaintiff's major problem in this case: the fact
that in his allegations, he maintained that he was substantially limited only
when his condition was left untreated. 3 In concluding that the plaintiff did not
have a disability under these circumstances, the court noted that because the
plaintiff would have been able to perform his major life activities with his
prescribed medication, and he voluntarily chose not to take his medication, his
post traumatic stress disorder did not substantially limit any major life
activity." 4
Relying on Tangires, the court noted, "[a] plaintiff who does not avail
himself of corrective medication is not a qualified individual under the
ADA." 5 The court then noted that the plaintiff's own statements that he could
control his impairment with medication were "admissions that his medication
successfully countered any debilitating effects of his asserted PTSD [post
traumatic stress disorder] such that it did not substantially interfere with the
led the court to
specific major life activity of working."3 6 Of course,3 this
17
Act?
the
under
disability
a
have
not
did
he
that
conclude
Once again, as did the courts in Tangires and Spradley, the court in Hewitt
took a very broad interpretation of Sutton and looked at an individual who was
not availing himself of an available mitigating measure as if he were doing so.
This went against the Supreme Court's statements in Sutton. Specifically, the
court did not take into account the "if' language from Sutton;3"' it did not take
into account the "might," "could," or "would" language from Sutton;319 it did
not use the individualized approach required by Bragdon and Sutton;32 it did
not apply the "actually faces" language from Sutton;32' and it also failed to
distinguish the case from the Sutton trilogy on the basis that the plaintiffs in
those cases availed themselves of the mitigating measures,322 while the plaintiff
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
at189.
Id.
Id.
Hewitt, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 189.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at482-83. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 1.
527 U.S. at 482-83. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
527 U.S. at 483. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3.
527 U.S. at 488. See discussion supra Part IV.B.4.
See discussion supra Part IV.B.5.
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in this case did not use the mitigating measure."' Had it done so, the Hewitt
court would have possibly reached the opposite conclusion with respect to the
disability determination issue. Additionally, the Hewitt decision further allows
courts to speculate about an individual's response to particular mitigating
measures. As the Court in Sutton noted, courts must look at the actual
limitations that a plaintiff faces, and in this case, as in Tangires and Spradley,
the plaintiff did experience actual limitations as a result of his impairment.324
Despite this, the courts in all three cases decided to take an overly expansive
view of Sutton and concluded that none of the plaintiffs was eligible for ADA
protection. 325
2. One Court That Has Limited the Sutton Opinion
Despite the expansive view of the Sutton trilogy taken by most courts, at
least one court has limited the reach of those opinions. Unlike the courts in
Tangires, Spradley, and Hewitt, a post-Sutton opinion that took a more
sympathetic, pro-plaintiffapproach was Finicalv. Collections Unlimited,Inc. 326
In Finical the plaintiff suffered from a hearing impairment, but after first
attempting to use a hearing aid, she later refused to use it to correct her
impairment. 327 The plaintiff was eventually terminated from her position, and
she subsequently sued her employer under the Act.328
The reason the plaintiff gave in her deposition for not wearing the hearing
aid was that when she used the device, the background noise the device picked
up was "annoying. 329 Despite this somewhat unpersuasive reason for not using
such a mitigating measure, the court ultimately decided that the plaintiff must
be evaluated in her uncorrectedstate. 33' The defendant argued that the plaintiff
must be evaluated with her hearing aids because medical testimony indicated
that had she wom the devices, she would have benefitted from them. 331 The
court rejected this argument and concluded that it was "flawed" because,
despite the fact that hearing aids would have helped the plaintiff, she did not,
in fact, use them.332
The court in Finicalfirst addressed all three cases in the Sutton trilogy and
observed that in each case, the plaintiffs did indeed use the available mitigating

323. Hewitt v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 183, 189 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).
324. See id.
325. Simply because a plaintiff proves that he has a disability under the Act does not mean
that the plaintiff will necessarily win the case. He must still prove that he was a "qualified
individual with a disability." See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000).
326. 65 F. Supp. 2d 1032 (D. Ariz. 1999).
327. Id. at 1037.
328. Id. at 1035.
329. Id. at 1037.
330. Id. at 1037-38.
331. Id.
332. Finical,65 F. Supp. 2d at 1037.
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measures.333 The court then addressed the three reasons the Supreme Court in
Sutton used for its justification of why mitigating measures must be used in
determining whether an individual has a disability within the meaning of the
Act.334 After addressing these issues, the court in Finical moved on to a
discussion of the facts in the present case.33
Specifically, and relying on Sutton, the court first concluded that the
individual, case-by-case analysis supported by the Sutton decision required the
court to look at whether the plaintiff actually used the available mitigating
measures.336 The court determined that the proper inquiry evaluates the
mitigating measures the plaintiff actuallyemploys, and if the plaintiff does not
employ any mitigating measures, she must be evaluated in that state.337
Specifically, the court observed:
As explained above, an individualized inquiry into the
limitations faced by a claimant who uses corrective devices
is inconsistent with an evaluation focusing on the limitations
the claimant would face in an uncorrected state. Likewise, an
individualized inquiry into the limitations faced by a claimant
who does not use corrective devices is inconsistent With an
evaluation focusing on the limitations the claimant would
face in a corrected state. Both approaches frequently require
speculation - with respect to the latter, speculation about the
limitations a plaintiff would face if she used a corrective
measure she presently does not use, and, with respect to the
former, speculation about the limitations a plaintiff would
face if she stopped using a corrective measure she presently
uses. Neither approach assesses the limitations the individual
actually faces in the present.338
As the quoted passage indicates, the court in Finicalwas most concerned
with the actuallimitations a plaintiff faced and did not want to speculate as to
how a plaintiff would be if that plaintiff did take advantage of the available
mitigating measure. Additionally, the court in Finicalwas interested in using
the case-by-case approach required by Bragdonand Sutton.339 Unlike the courts
in Tangires, Spradley, and Hewitt, the court in Finical heeded the other
statements in Sutton. Specifically, the court did take into account the "if'
language from Sutton;340it took into account the "might," "could," or "would"
333. Id. at 1036-37.
334. Id. at 1037.
335. Id. at 1037-38.

336. Id.
337. Id. at 1038.
338. Finical,65 F. Supp. 2d at 1038 (citations omitted).

339. Id.
340. Id. (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482). See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
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language from Sutton;14 1 it utilized the individual inquiry approach required by
Sutton andBragdon;342it applied the "actually faces" language from Sutton;343
and it also distinguished the case from the Sutton trilogy on the basis that while
the plaintiffs in those cases availed themselves of the mitigating measures, the
plaintiff in Finical did not use the mitigating measure. 344 By doing so, it
acknowledged the actual limitations the plaintiff faced and came to a
conclusion that was not inconsistent with the Sutton trilogy. This narrow
reading of Sutton is certainly the type of approach ADA plaintiffs (and their
attorneys) are hoping more courts will follow.
However, the Finicalcourt did not elaborate upon whether some reasons
for not using available mitigating measures were better than other reasons.345
For example, the court allowed the plaintiff's determination that hearing aids
were "annoying" to release her from her duty to attempt to mitigate or alleviate
her impairment. 3" This is the minority approach and a much more lenient
approach than the ones used by the courts in the previously-discussed opinions
in Tangires, Spradley,Panaglos,Hewitt, andBowers, where the courts did not
seem to care why the plaintiffs were not using mitigating measures to correct
their impairments.
VI. MY SUGGESTED APPROACH AND HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLES UNDER THAT
APPROACH

As expressed earlier in this Article, my suggested approach to resolve this
dilemma is always to evaluate plaintiffs who do not mitigate their impairments
in their uncorrected or unmitigated condition; however, the reasons for a
plaintiffs failure to mitigate will then be analyzed when determining what
constitutes a reasonable accommodation and undue hardship.
The factors that the courts should consider include the cost of the
mitigating measure, its effectiveness, its level of invasiveness, its level of risk,
its potential side effects, any cosmetic issues associated with it, and any other
factors that the employee evaluates when deciding not to use the mitigating
measure. The more expensive, invasive, cosmetically unappealing, and risky
the available mitigating measure becomes, then the more the employer must do
to accommodate the employee. On the other hand, if the mitigating measure is
inexpensive, effective, non-invasive, and relatively risk-free, the employer
would not be required to do as much for the employee seeking the
accommodation. Therefore, this "sliding scale" approach would require courts
to look at the reasons behind the employee's decision not to use the available

341. Id. (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482). See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
342. Id. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3.
343. Id. See discussion supra Part IV.B.4.

344. Finical,65 F. Supp. 2d at 1036-38. See discussion supra Part IV.B.5.
345. See Finical,65 F. Supp. 2d at 1041.

346. Id. at 1037.
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measure and then determine whether the accommodation is reasonable and
whether it would place an undue hardship on the employer.
To apply this sliding scale approach, consider two individuals who suffer
from severe impairments, but who, with some type of mitigating measure,
would not satisfy the definition of disability under the Act. Assume in these
cases that the individual with the "disability" asked for a reasonable
accommodation under the Act, and the employer refused the request based on
the belief that the employer is not required to accommodate the individual
because the employee is not considered disabled under the Act.347
A.

Crohn 's Disease Hypothetical348

First, consider David, a thirty-five-year-old male who suffers from Crohn's
Disease, 49 a gastrointestinal condition similar to the plaintiff's ulcerative colitis
in the Pangalos case. David's symptoms include difficulty eating, chronic
diarrhea, weight loss, and severe inflammation of parts of the intestines.35 °
There are various treatment options for this condition, none of which will cure
the condition. The medications available to David can indeed treat the
condition to a point where he will not be substantially limited in any major life
activity (such as eating), but they will not cure David of his disease. Some of
the medications that have been used to treat this condition are Prednisone (a
"'
steroid) and 6-mp (a chemotherapy drug sometimes used by cancer patients).35
Another possible way to treat this disease is through surgery; however, in most
patients, the symptoms of Crohn's Disease reappear within a few years, and the
surgery could 2also result in the need for a colostomy for the remainder of
35
David's life.
353
Due to concerns about potential side effects of Prednisone and 6-mp,
David does not want to start taking these medications. Additionally, because
he does not want to endure the surgery and live with a colostomy, he does not
want to explore that alternative either. The one accommodation he has
requested is that his employer allow him to move his office next to the men's
lavatory, which would allow him to quickly access the facility if and when his
347. Admittedly, most employers would be willing to accommodate an employee in these
situations. However, these examples are simply being used to demonstrate how my approach
would work in a situation when an employer would not make such an accommodation.
348. This hypothetical is patterned somewhat after Pangalosv. PrudentialInsurance Co.
ofAmerica, No. 96-0167, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15749 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 1996).
349. For more information on Crohn's Disease, see HARRiSON'S, supra note 216.
350. See HARRISON'S, supra note 216, at 1636-37.
351. For this and other information about this disease and the medications used to treat it,
see Crohn's & Colitis Foundation of America, Crohn's Disease and Ulcerative Colitis:
Medications, at http://www.ccfa.org (last modified Apr. 30, 2002) [hereinafter Crohn's
Foundation].
352. HARIuSON'S, supra note 216, at 1644-45.
353. For more information about the side effects of these and other medications, see
Crohn's Foundation, supra note 351.
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condition forces him to use it. Despite the fact that this accommodation would
cost nothing to the employer (except perhaps the minimal expenses associated
with moving an office), the employer decides to deny the request, believing that
David is not disabled and therefore will not have a cause of action under the
ADA.
Under the pro-employer interpretation of Sutton, as expressed in Hewitt,
Tangires, and Spradley, David would most likely be unsuccessful in his ADA
case. Requiring him to be evaluated in his medicated or corrected state, even
though he did not use medication or elect to have surgery, would most likely
result in a determination that he does not have a disability. In turn, this would
result in the conclusion that the company would not be required to make any
type of accommodation.
In addition to being inconsistent with both the Supreme Court's warnings
in Sutton and the goals behind the ADA, this conclusion violates the underlying
principle of fairness. First, this outcome is inconsistent with various portions
of Sutton. The Court in Sutton specifically indicated that mitigating measures
should be evaluated if the plaintiff is indeed using them. 354 As was indicated
previously, in Sutton, as well as in Murphy andAlbertson 's, the plaintiffs were
indeed utilizing mitigating measures. 55 In the current hypothetical, a broad
interpretation of Sutton should not apply because David is not using the
available mitigating measures. Therefore, although the courts following the
Tangires, Spradley, and Hewitt approach would rule in favor of the company
in this hypothetical, such a result is not required under Sutton.
The second warning from the Sutton opinion with which this outcome
would be inconsistent is Sutton's requirement of an individualized, case-bycase approach that looks at the actual, rather than hypothetical or potential,
limitation on any major life activities.15' This approach was expressed in the
Bragdon opinion, but was clearly made a part of the mitigating measures issue
in Sutton.357 In the present case, if David refuses to utilize the available
mitigating measures, and if the disease is severe enough to substantially limit
his ability to eat or substantially limit any other of David's major life activities,
his impairment would presently, and not potentially or hypothetically,
substantially limit a major life activity.35 To follow the Tangires,Spradley,and
Hewitt approach would violate this principle from Sutton.
The third reason why such a pro-employer interpretation of Sutton is
inappropriate relates to the issue of speculation-the "might," "could," or

354.
355.
356.
357.

527 U.S. at 482.
Id. at 475; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 519; Albertson 's, 527 U.S. at 565.
527 U.S. at 482-83, 488.
Id. (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1998)).

358. This would also go against the warning in the Sutton opinion that "(tihe use or nonuse
of acorrective device does not determine whether an individual is disabled; that determination
depends on whether the limitations an individual with an impairment actuallyfaces are in fact
substantially limiting." Id. at 488 (second emphasis added).
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"would" language from the Sutton opinion 3 .9 and the "actually faces" language

from the Sutton opinion. a" This is very similar to the "hypothetical" or
361
"potential" disability issue that the Court warned about in Sutton.
Specifically, the issue of speculation addresses the point that if courts look at
mitigating measures a plaintiff is not utilizing, then courts are in effect required
to become medical experts who decide how the plaintiff's body would react if
the plaintiff took advantage of drugs or other mitigating measures. While this
might not be extremely difficult with respect to eyeglasses or a prosthetic limb,
it would most certainly not be an easy calculation when determining how a
plaintiff s body would react to any type of medication. In essence, looking at
the plaintiff with respect to mitigating measures such as medicine, even if the
plaintiff is not using them, will require courts to guess how a body will react
62
and will allow courts to second-guess the impaired individual.1 The court in
Finicalspecifically used this reasoning as one justification for not applying
Sutton to cases where a plaintiff is not availing himself of an available
mitigating measure.363
In addition to being inconsistent with the statements in Sutton, evaluating
David with respect to mitigating measures also defeats the underlying purpose
behind the Act and allows employers, to a certain extent, to control their
employees' healthcare decisions. With respect to the underlying goal of the
Act, one such purpose is to require employers to reasonably accommodate
36 In the present
individuals who need some type of accommodation.
hypothetical, where David's employer could have provided a simple
accommodation at little or no cost, not providing the accommodation would not
violate the Act because, after considering mitigating measures, David does not
have a disability and is therefore not entitled to an accommodation. This unjust
result cannot be what Congress intended.
Second, with respect to the issue of allowing employers to exercise some
control over their employees' healthcare decisions, adopting the pro-employer
approach of Tangires, Spradley, and Hewitt would, to a certain extent, force
employees to choose between potential protection under the Act and their jobs.
Specifically, these cases force employees to use available mitigating measures
even if they are concerned about the possible medical ramifications. It would
require plaintiffs to decide between taking potentially harmful drugs and
keeping their jobs. Again, this violates the broad remedial purpose behind the
Act. Accordingly, courts should not be evaluating plaintiffs who do not use
mitigating measures as if they were using such measures.

359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.

Id. at 482.
Id. at 488.
Id. at 482-83.
See Finical v. Collections Unlimited, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1038 (D. Ariz. 1999).
Id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
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Unlike applying the pro-employer approach followed by most courts,
applying this Article's proposed approach to the previous hypothetical results
in an outcome that appears to be reasonable to most observers. Specifically,
because David was not taking any mitigating measures, the determination of
whether he had a disability would be made without looking at any mitigating
measures. Thus, he would be considered disabled under the Act. The issues
then become whether, in light of the reasons why David is not taking the
medication or undergoing surgery, the requested accommodation is reasonable
and whether it would impose an undue hardship. Because the cost of the
accommodation is minimal, and because the reasons for David's decision not
to use mitigating measures are reasonable (fear of side effects and desire to
avoid surgery), David's employer would be required to allow him to move his
office. This outcome can hardly be considered objectionable.
Finally, such a result would be consistent with the relevant portions of
Sutton. Specifically, such an approach takes into account the "if' language
from Sutton;365 it takes into account the "might," "could," or "would" language
from Sutton;36 it uses the individualized approach required by Bragdon and
Sutton;167 and it applies the "actually faces" language from Sutton.161 The
approach also recognizes that the facts from the cases in the Sutton trilogy are
different because in those cases all plaintiffs used mitigating measures.36 9
Therefore, the result reached is just and consistent with the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Act.
Now consider a slight modification of the facts of the previous
hypothetical. Instead of having the available treatment options being
Prednisone, 6-mp, or surgery, assume that David's Crohn's Disease could be
controlled with an effective, inexpensive, and perfectly safe drug. However,
because David does not want to bother being placed on a regimen of having to
take two of these pills every day, he decides not to use the medication. He has
asked his employer for the accommodation of having his office relocated next
to the men's room or, in the alternative, having a private bathroom installed in
his private office. Believing that David does not have a disability, his employer
refuses both requests.
Under the pro-employer Sutton approach, because the medication would
help him, David would most !:ely not be protected under the Act. However,
unlike the previous hypotheticul, David's case is not particularly sympathetic.
Despite his situation's lack of sympathy, under this Article's proposed
approach, David would still be evaluated in his unmitigated condition and most
likely be found to have a disability. However, this does not mean that he would

365. 527 U.S. at 482. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 1.
366. Id. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
367. Id. at 483. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3.
368. Id. at 488. See discussion supra Part IV.B.4.
369. Id.
at 475; Murphy v. United Parcel Service, 527 U.S. 516, 519 (1999); Albertson's,
Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565 (1999). See discussion supra Part IV.B.5.
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prevail in his ADA claim. Specifically, even though David would be
considered disabled under the Act, when the court evaluates the reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship aspects of the case, the court will be able
to consider David's reason for not availing himself of the available mitigating
measure. And, because his reason is not particularly persuasive, the court
should require from David's employer little, if any, effort or cost to
accommodate him. Thus, the court would reach a just result and would not shut
the doors on other plaintiffs who have legitimate reasons for not availing
themselves of available mitigating measures.
Additionally, such a result would be consistent with the relevant portions
of Sutton. Specifically, such an approach takes into account the "if' language
from Sutton; it takes into account the "might," "could," or "would" language
from Sutton;37' it uses the individualized approach required by Bragdon and
3
Sutton;372 and it applies the "actually faces" language from Sutton. " The
approach also recognizes that the facts from the cases in the Sutton trilogy are
374
different because in those cases, all plaintiffs used mitigating measures.
Therefore, the result reached is a just one and is consistent with the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Act.
B. Vision ImpairmentHypothetical375
Consider another application of this Article's proposed approach. Michelle
is a twenty-five-year-old woman who has a vision impairment. Without the use
of corrective lenses, her vision is substantially limited. However, if she were
to use corrective lenses, such as eyeglasses or contact lenses, her vision would
improve to a level where she would not be substantially limited in her ability
to see. In this case, the only factor preventing Michelle from correcting her
impairment is her dislike of the way she looks in glasses, and she does not like
the way contact lenses feel in her eyes. She has requested that her employer
provide her with a moderately priced device to use on her computer monitor
that would enlarge the characters on her screen. Her employer has denied her
request, believing that she is not disabled under the Act because she could
easily correct her impairment by purchasing corrective lenses.
Unlike the situations when the potential plaintiffs did not avail themselves
of mitigating measures due to cost, fear of side effects, or fear of invasive
surgery, this fact pattern does not create a sense of unfairness to the plaintiff.
Using the pro-employer approach of Tangires,Spradley, andHewitt, Michelle
370. 527 U.S. at 482. See discussion supra Part IV.B. I.
371. Id. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
372. Id. at 483. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3.

373. Id. at 488. See discussion supra Part IV.B.4.
374. Id. at 475; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 519; and Albertson 's, 527 U.S. at 565. See discussion
supra Part IV.B.5.
375. This hypothetical is based on Sutton, 527 U.S. at 471, and Finicalv.Collections
Unlimited, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1038 (D. Ariz. 1999).
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would not be covered under the Act because she could correct her impairment.
Of course, because the facts of this case do not give rise to a sense of injustice,
the pro-employer Sutton approach seems reasonable. However, the approach
supported by this Article would also result in the "right" outcome in this case.
Specifically, although Michelle would be considered to have a disability
under the Act based on this suggested approach, when the court turns to the
reasonable accommodation and undue hardship issues and looks at the rather
unconvincing reasons why Michelle will not avail herself of the mitigating
measures available to her, the court should reject her reasonable
accommodation ADA claim. Because the available remedy is inexpensive, does
not have negative side effects, is only being refused due to cosmetic reasons,
and will provide very effective results, Michelle's employer will be required
to do very little (if anything) to accommodate her request. This approach, while
not closing the ADA doors on other potential plaintiffs, does not end in a result
that is unreasonable to employers. This is yet one more example of why the
approach suggested in this Article is indeed just and reasonable.
Additionally, such a result would be consistent with the relevant portions
of Sutton. Specifically, such an approach takes into account the "if' language
from Sutton;376 it takes into account the "might," "could," or "would" language
from Sutton;377 it uses the individualized approach required by Bragdon and
Sutton;378 and it applies the "actually faces" language from Sutton.379 The
approach also recognizes that the facts from the cases in the Sutton trilogy are
different because in those cases, all plaintiffs used mitigating measures. °
Therefore, the result reached is just, and one consistent with the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Act.
Although an application of the pro-employer approach to the abovementioned hypothetical does not strike a sense of unfairness into most people,
a slight change in the facts could change this sense. Specifically, assume for a
moment that corrective lenses will not help Michelle, but rather she would need
eye surgery to correct her vision impairment. Although she knows this surgery
would improve her vision to a close-to-normal level, she does not want to
undergo the surgery because she is very concerned that the surgery might go
wrong and cause other problems or further damage her eyes. Her belief is based
to a certain extent on the fact that a former family member has been
permanently injured as a result of undergoing similar surgery. Because she does
not want to undergo the surgery, she asks for an accommodation at work.
However, her employer, believing that she does not have a disability under the

376. 527 U.S. at 482. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.

377. Id. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
378. Id. at 483. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3.

379. Id. at 488. See discussion supra Part IV.B.4.
380. Id. at 475; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 519; Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 565. See discussion
supra Part IV.B.5.
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Act because she could correct her visual impairment with this surgery, denies
the request.
This slight change of facts makes the decision as to whether she should be
protected under the Act much more difficult. Unlike the previous hypothetical,
where Michelle could have simply put on corrective lenses to improve her
sight, in this case she must undergo a surgery that could have a negative
outcome. Using the pro-employer Sutton approach, Michelle would be outside
of the Act's protection because she could correct her impairment by surgery.
Once again, this would ignore some of the very important parts of the Sutton
opinion. Specifically, it would ignore the "if' language from Sutton;... it would
ignore the "might," "could," or "would" language from Sutton;312 it would not
use the individualized approach required by Bragdon and Sutton;313 and it
would ignore the "actually faces" language from Sutton.3 "4 Finally, this would
also ignore the fact that in Sutton, Murphy, and Albertson 's, the plaintiffs did
indeed avail themselves of the mitigating measures.3 5 Additionally, it would
raise the speculation issue that often arises in this situation. Conversely, under
the approach articulated and followed in Finical,Michelle would be protected
under the Act because in her present state, she is substantially limited in her
ability to see.38 6 This would be consistent with the Sutton concerns about
hypothetical and potential disabilities 3 7 and would also keep in mind that38in the
Sutton trilogy, all plaintiffs were indeed using the mitigating measures.
Using the approach proposed in this Article would yield the appropriate
result-one that will balance the employer's interests and the employee's
interests. Specifically, Michelle would be evaluated in her unmitigated state at
the initial determination of whether she has a disability. Because, in her
unmitigated state, she is substantially limited in her ability to see, she would
pass the initial hurdle. Then, when the court gets to the reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship parts of the ADA analysis, the court will
analyze the reasons behind Michelle's refusal to avail herself of the mitigating
measures. The more rational Michelle's justification, then the more the
employer will be required to provide as an accommodation. As previously
suggested, this type of "sliding scale" approach at the reasonable
accommodation stage of an ADA claim would strike a balance between the
concerns of employers and employees. Although this approach does not
provide as much certainty as the strict, pro-employer interpretation of Sutton,
the purpose behind the ADA is to help individuals with disabilities, not to make

381. 527 U.S. at 482. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
382. 527 U.S. at 482. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
383. 527 U.S. at 483. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3.
384. 527 U.S. at 488. See discussion supra Part IV.B.4.
385. 527 U.S. at 475; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 519; Albertson 's, 527 U.S. at 565. See discussion
supra Part IV.B.5.
386. Finical v. Collections Unlimited, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1038 (D. Ariz. 1999).
387. 527 U.S. at 482.
388. Id. at 475; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 519; Albertson 's, 527 U.S. at 565.
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litigation predictable." 9 The approach suggested in this Article would also put
the brakes on the pro-employer momentum of the Sutton opinion and would
weigh both parties' interests in deciding reasonable accommodation cases
brought under the Act. Certainly, this approach is not an unreasonable way of
resolving these situations, and it provides ADA protection for those who are in
desperate need of it.
VII. CONCLUSION

Since the Supreme Court's decisions in the Sutton trilogy, many courts
have been looking at ADA plaintiffs in their corrected or mitigated state even
if they were not availing themselves of the mitigating measures that would have
corrected their impairments. As a result, many ADA plaintiffs are losing the
protection of the Act even though they are, in their current unmitigated state,
substantially limited in one or more of their major life activities. Because courts
have concluded that these people do not come within the class of persons
protected by the Act, they are not entitled to any accommodations by their
employers. Very few courts have taken the opposite approach-the approach
that evaluates plaintiffs in their actual condition when they are not using
mitigating measures.
As this Article demonstrates, in cases involving requests for reasonable
accommodations, courts should evaluate unmitigated plaintiffs in their actual
state to determine whether they come within the ADA's definition of disability.
Then, when determining what constitutes a reasonable accommodation or
undue hardship, courts should look at the reasons behind the plaintiffs'
decisions not to correct their impairments. The factors the courts should look
at include the cost of the mitigating measure, its effectiveness, its side effects,
the degree of invasiveness, the cosmetic ramifications of the mitigating
measures, and any other reasons for the plaintiffs' decisions not to use the
available mitigating measure. The more risky, the more invasive, and the more
expensive the treatment option becomes, then the more of an accommodation
the employer should be required to provide. On the other hand, as the treatment
option becomes less risky, less invasive, less costly, and more effective, the
employer should be required to make a lesser accommodation. This would
protect plaintiffs who have legitimate concerns over treatment options and
would also protect employers from unreasonable employees who are unwilling
to take responsibility for dealing with their physical or mental impairments.
Despite the pro-employer position most courts have taken on this issue, the
approach suggested in this Article is certainly an acceptable reading of the
Sutton trilogy and would certainly further the goals behind the Act.
Because such an approach would be consistent with the Act, the Court's
interpretation of the Act, the EEOC's and the Department of Justice's initial

389. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2002).
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interpretation of the Act, the legislative history behind the Act, and because
such an approach would result in the right outcome more often than the
approach being used by the courts that have adopted a broad interpretation of
Sutton, courts should seriously consider looking at the mitigating measures
issue at the reasonable accommodation and undue hardship stages of an ADA
case rather than at the initial stage of determining whether an individual has a
disability. Such an approach would keep the ADA doors open to those who
need the ADA's protection and would still protect employers' interests when
unreasonable employees who can easily help themselves seek to take advantage
of this landmark legislation.
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